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INDIAN HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS:
THE ROLE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
AND PREEMPTION
LAURIE REYNOLDSt
American Indian tribes enjoy afederally-protected quasi-so vereign
status within the states in which they are located The vague limits of
tribal sovereignty, however, result in overlapping state laws and tribal
regulations and corresponding tensions between state and tribal authori-
ties. Professor Reynolds suggests a presumption of tribalpreemption of
state regulation in such situations, which a state could overcome only by
a showing of necessity. The suggestion is supported by analysis of the
conflict between tribal hunting andfishing rights and state wildiffe regu-
lations. The nature andfrequency of theproblems in this area make it
a helpfulparadigm, but the conclusions reached are applicable to the
full range of conflicts between state and tribal authority.
Because they possess certain attributes of sovereignty, Indian tribes fre-
quently have challenged a state government's attempt to assert its power over
the tribes' members or territories.1 Tribal hunting and fishing rights have pro-
vided a fertile testing ground for clashes between state and tribal sovereignty. 2
In no other area of state-tribal disputes are the conflicting interests of both
parties so clearly defined. Historically, the land and its resources have played
a central role in tribal life. Hunting and fishing, aside from satisfying basic
needs of subsistence, often have provided the tribe with a source of income
and have played an important part in religious and ceremonial aspects of tri-
bal life.3 Moreover, the states' heightened awareness of the need to preserve
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. B.S., 1972, Ge-
orgetown; M.A., 1974, J.D., 1980, Illinois.
1. Although the doctrine of tribal sovereignty has undergone extensive refinement and mod-
ification since first articulated, see infra text accompanying notes 245-50, recent Supreme Court
cases have recognized the continued vitality of tribal sovereignty: "Indian tribes are unique aggre-
gations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory ...
[They] are a good deal more than 'private, voluntary organizations."' United States v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 487 F.2d 14, 19 (10th Cir. 1974)).
For a discussion of many aspects of the contours of state, tribal and federal sovereignty, see
TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL, STATE, & TRIBAL JURISDICTION, REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE AND
TRIBAL JURISDICTION (1976) (Final Report to the American Indian Policy Review Commission).
2. Commentators have discussed various aspects of the problem. Eg., Burnett, Indian
Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Rights: The Record and the Controversy, 7 IDAHO L. REv. 49
(1970); Hobbs, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights 11, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1251 (1969); John-
son, The State Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing Rights, 47 WASH. L. REv. 207 (1972);
Schmidhauser, The Struggle for Cultural Survival- The Fishing Rights of the Treaty Tribes of the
Pac c Northwest, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 30 (1976); Comment, Indian Hunting andFishing Rights,
10 ARIZ. L. REv. 725 (1968); Comment, Indian Regulation of Non-Indian Hunting and Fishing,
1974 WIs. L. REv. 499.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 350-53 (W.D. Wash. 1974),
affd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976); United States v. Michigan,
471 F. Supp. 192, 213 (W.D. Mich. 1979), vacatedandremandedper curiam, 623 F.2d 448 (6th Cir.
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valuable wildlife resources, on the one hand, and current federal policy en-
couraging maximum tribal self-government, on the other, have accentuated
the conflicting assertions of state and tribal power. In addition, a long history
of mutual distrust and lack of cooperation between the state and the tribes
provides a strong undercurrent to present conflicts.
The disputes surface in various contexts because challenges to state or
tribal assertions of control over hunting and fishing implicate two fundamen-
tal aspects of tribal sovereignty-control over territory and control over tribal
members.4 After reviewing the source and scope of Indian hunting and fishing
rights, this Article defines the limits of federally protected tribal sovereignty
over hunting and fishing. Subsequently, this Article reviews state attempts to
regulate and suggests that state regulation of both on- and off-reservation
hunting and fishing rights should be subjected to the same stringent analysis.
This Article offers a preemption approach that would minimize state incur-
sions on tribal sovereignty while protecting important state regulatory inter-
ests. Specifically, the analysis suggests a statutorily based presumption of
preemption over a state's regulation in any area where tribal sovereign powers
have received federal protection. This analysis, though especially applicable
to hunting and fishing rights because of the traditional importance of game
and wildlife to tribal life, also may find application in other areas in which
tribal and state powers clash.
I. SOURCE AND SCOPE OF INDIAN HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS
4. Aboriginal Rights
At an early stage in the development of the federal government's relation-
ship with Indian tribes, the Supreme Court recognized that the tribes, as the
original inhabitants of the country, possessed an aboriginal right to occupy the
land. Deriving from the tribe's possession prior to discovery and settlement by
Europeans, aboriginal title extends to all lands occupied exclusively by the
1980). For a general introduction to traditional Indian hunting and fishing activities, see R. SPEN-
CER & J. JENNINGS, THE NATIVE AMERICANS (New York, 1965).
4. For purposes of federal criminal law, the relevant territorial distinction is "Indian coun-
try," which applies federal law to all land within the borders of the reservation, "notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent." 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982). Although this statutory provision defines
the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction on the reservation, it reflects general congressional intent
to limit state powers on the reservation: "While § 1151 is concerned on its face, only with criminal
jurisdiction, the Court has recognized that it generaly applies as well to questions of civil jurisdic-
tion." DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975) (citations omitted).
Non-Indian land on the reservation is the product of the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch.
119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1982)), and specific allot-
ment acts relating to individual tribes, e.g., the Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751 (1920),
which authorized individual ownership of former tribal lands. See generally F. COHEN, HAND-
BOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 127-39 (1982); D. OTIs, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT
OF INDIAN LANDS (1973).
See Special Recent Developments, Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysts of Montana v. United
States, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 175 (1980); Note, 17 LAND & WATER L. REv. 189 (1982); Note,
Montana v. U.S.-Efects on Liberal Treaty Interpretation and Indian Rights to Lands Underlyng
NavIgable Waters, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 689 (1982) for critical discussions of Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), discussed infra text accompanying notes 127-47.
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tribe since time immemorial; it is valid against all persons unless and uitil
extinguished by the federal government.5 Broadly defined to include all "ben-
eficial incidents" of occupancy,6 aboriginal title has uniformly been found to
include the rights to hunt and fish.7 Because the ultimate fee interest rests in
the United States, however, the holder of aboriginal title cannot assert a real
property interest in land; rather, the interest is a possessory one, a mere per-
missive right of occupancy.8 Thus, efforts to transfer an interest in land held
under claim of aboriginal title are invalid without congressional approval. 9
Aboriginal title is further limited by the federal government's absolute
power to modify or abrogate.10 Congress11 may extinguish aboriginal title "by
treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the exercise of complete dominion ad-
verse to the right of occupancy, or otherwise. . . . The manner, method and
time of such extinguishment raise political, not justiciable issues." 12 More-
over, extinguishment of aboriginal title does not give rise to a taking claim
under the fifth amendment. 13
Although congressional power is unlimited, the courts will not lightly in-
fer that the power to extinguish aboriginal title has been exercised; congres-
sional intent must be clear. In United States v. Dann, 14 for example, the Ninth
Circuit found that aboriginal Indian title had not been extinguished, notwith-
standing several federal legislative enactments related to the disputed land.15
First, the court determined that the Homestead Act,16 which granted home-
steads within the tribe's aboriginal holdings, did not constitute sufficient exer-
cise of dominion to extinguish aboriginal title to unsettled land. Second, the
court rejected the argument that Congress' administration of the lands under
5. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823).
6. Shoshone v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 496 (1937).
7. United States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (D. Minn. 1977), aft'dper curiam sub
noma. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 614 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 905 (1980); In re Wilson, 30 Cal. 3d 21, 26, 634 P.2d 363, 365, 177 Cal. Rptr. 336, 339
(1981). See also Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908), in which the Supreme Court
indicated that it would give broad protection to Indian claims of implied reservation of aboriginal
rights.
8. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974); Tee-Hit-Ton Indi-
ans v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955).
9. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
10. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); United States v. Santa Fe Pac.
R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
11. Executive action unauthorized by Congress would not be effective to extinguish aborigi-
nal title. United States v. Dann, 706 F.2d 919, 928 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 689-90 (9th Cir. 1976).
12. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941) (citations omitted).
13. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 284-85 (1955).
14. 706 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983).
15. The Indian parties in Dann asserted aboriginal title as a defense to a trespass suit brought
by the federal government to stop the Danns from grazing their cattle on federal lands without a
permit. Although the Supreme Court had already established that Indian aboriginal rights had
survived on lands incorporated into the United States by treaty with Mexico, United States v.
Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1941), of which the disputed lands inDann were a part,
the government nevertheless contended that several federal statutes evidenoed clear congressional
intent to extinguish aboriginal title. See 706 F.2d at 922.
16. Ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (repealed 1976).
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the Taylor Grazing Act 17 had extinguished Indian title. Nor did the treaty
establishing a reservation for the tribe evidence sufficient intent to destroy the
tribe's title to its vast expanse of aboriginal territory. Thus, the court con-
cluded, the Indian defendants could raise their aboriginal title as a defense to
a prosecution for trespass on federal lands.18 If, however, a court concludes
that the federal government's actions do manifest an absolute and uncondi-
tional intent to extinguish aboriginal title, the court must hold that the United
States or its grantee has acquired a "perfect and unburdened title."'19 Thus,
unless otherwise excluded from extinguishment, loss of aboriginal title results
in loss of all incidents of that title, including hunting and fishing rights.2
0
The original treaty with the particular Indian tribe is the primary tool for
determining whether aboriginal hunting and fishing rights have survived the
extinguishment of Indian title. In some instances, the tribe retains those hunt-
ing and fishing rights that were incidents of its aboriginal title2 1 although it
had agreed to cede its aboriginal title to a particular parcel of land. Reserva-
tion of aboriginal hunting and fishing rights need not be expressly stipulated
in the treaty, however. A court could find that events prior to the treaty, cir-
cumstances surrounding the treaty's negotiations, and subsequent actions by
the parties to the treaty revealed an oral or implied agreement that the tribes
could continue to hunt and fish on areas over which they had relinquished
their aboriginal title.22
A finding that aboriginal rights have received either express or implied
federal recognition has important legal consequences. "Recognized" title, as
distinguished from aboriginal title, gives the holder a property interest that, if
taken by the government, gives rise to a claim for just compensation.23 Recog-
nized hunting and fishing rights are entitled to the same protection against
uncompensated takings.24 Moreover, federal recognition of aboriginal hunt-
17. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1976). Pursuant to this Act, the Secretary of the Interior can issue per-
mits for cattle grazing on the public domain.
18. But ef United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 982
(1976) (forcible expulsion of the Indians, followed by continuous use of the land as a national
forest, culminating in final payment of a tribal claim, provided ample evidence of congressional
intent to extinguish aboriginal title).
19. Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 389 (1902).
20. E.g., United States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Minn. 1979), afl'dper cur/am sub
nonm. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 614 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 905 (1980);Inre Wilson, 30 Cal. 3d 21, 634 P.2d 363, 177 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1981). For an
argument that aboriginal hunting and fishing rights are not extinguished with aboriginal title, see
Wilson, 30 Cal. 3d at 37, 634 P.2d at 373, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 346 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
21. See, e.g., Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, United States-Nisquallys Tribe, 10
Stat. 1132 (reserving "the right to fish at all usual and accustomed fishing grounds and stations.");
Treaty of 1855, art III, June 11, 1855, United States-Nez Perce Tribe, 12 Stat. 957 (reserving the
"privilege of hunting ... upon open and unclaimed land."); Fort Bridger Treaty, art. IV, June 6
1900, United States-Bannock and Shoshone Tribes, 31 Stat. 672 (reserving the right to hunt and
fish on ceded lands "so long as any of the lands... remain part of the public domain").
22. See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 216 (W.D. Mich. 1979), vacated
andremandedper curiam, 623 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp.
1382 (D. Minn. 1979), aft'dper curiama sub nom Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minne-
sota, 614 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).
23. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).
24. See Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp.
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ing and fishing rights carries a much greater degree of protection against state
interference with, and regulation of, these rights. Whereas unextinguished ab-
original hunting and fishing rights generally appear to be subject to state wild-
life regulation, 25 the courts have insulated federally recognized hunting and
fishing rights from state regulation unless such regulation meets carefully de-
fined standards and is necessary to further an important state interest.26 Thus,
tribal struggles to obtain judicial confirmation of hunting and fishing rights
rarely rest on the assertion that aboriginal hunting and fishing rights have sur-
vived without extinguishment; rather, the tribe typically will argue that those
aboriginal rights were subsequently confirmed by the federal government,
either expressly by treaty, or impliedly through its actions. If the tribe is suc-
cessful in that crucial threshold issue, the disputed hunting and fishing rights
then become subject to the same rules governing judicial analysis of other fed-
erally recognized Indian rights.
B. Federal Recognition of Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights
1. On-Reservation Hunting and Fishing
Creation of an Indian reservation, by treaty, statute, or executive order,27
typically reserves to the Indian tribe the rights to hunt and fish on the reserva-
tion. Even when the treaty makes no mention of these on-reservation rights, a
court is likely to find that the creation of the reservation itself guaranteed the
tribe's rights to engage in hunting and fishing activities. Thus, because hunt-
ing and fishing are "normal incidents of Indian life," the Supreme Court has
construed a treaty creating a reservation "for a home to be held as Indian
lands are held" as reserving the rights to hunt and fish.28 This conclusion
follows logically from the fact that reservations were conoeived so that the
Indians could preserve their way of life. As the Supreme Court of Minnesota
noted when analyzing a treaty that made no mention of the Indians' right to
hunt and fish on the reservation: "Certainly it would be incongruous to con-
strue the treaty as denying the Indians their very means of existence while
purporting to grant them a home."'29
553 (D. Ore. 1977); Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
818 (1962).
25. See Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 76 (1962).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 152-63.
27. See Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1981); State v. Lowe, 109 Wis. 2d 663,
327 N.W.2d 166 (1982). Until 1871 federal-Indian affairs were conducted by treaty. The Appro-
priations Act of 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)), prohibited
further treaties, primarily because of congressional desire to exercise control over Indian affairs.
This Act, though changing the form of Indian-U.S. relations, did not change the substance of
those relations. See F. COHEN, supra note 4, at 127.
28. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 405-06 (1968).
29. State v. Clark, 282 N.W.2d 902, 909 (Minn. 1979). See also State v. Gurnoe, 53 Wis. 2d
390, 405, 192 N.W.2d 892, 899 (1972) (construing treaty language "to set apart and withhold from
sale, for the use of the Chippewas" as including the right to hunt and fish).
The Gurnoe court limited the tribe's treaty right to those types and methods of fishing em-
ployed by the tribe at the time of the treaty and to those modem methods that are "reasonably
consistent" with those traditional techniques. Id. at 411, 192 N.W.2d at 902. The concurring
judges expressed some doubt about the need to deprive treaty fishermen of the advantages of
1984]
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On-reservation hunting and fishing rights generally are exclusive to the
Indian tribal members for whom the reservation was created, even if the exclu-
sivity was not expressly stipulated in the treaty creating the reservation.30 The
exclusivity of the hunting and fishing rights derives in part from the tribe's
power to exclude nonmembers from the reservation 31 and in part from the
tribe's retained sovereignty over tribal territory.32 Thus, the courts have up-
held a tribe's right to regulate nonmember hunting and fishing on the reserva-
tion.33 In addition, Indians exercising hunting and fishing rights on the
reservation generally are beyond the jurisdiction of state laws.34
Although exclusive at the time the reservation was created, on-reservation
hunting and fishing rights may be reduced by subsequent congressional action.
If, for example, large amounts of reservation land were sold to non-Indian
owners pursuant to the General Allotment Act,35 a court likely would find that
the hunting and fishing rights of the reservation Indians had lost their exclu-
sive character and must be shared with non-Indians.36 When non-Indian
ownership on the reservation is minimal, however, the Supreme Court has
indicated that tribes retain their powers to exclude nonmembers and to control
on-reservation hunting and fishing activities.37 The loss of exclusive tribal
control of on-reservation activities alone does not subject tribal members on
the reservation to state regulatory powers. Rather, the result is frequently an
uneasy coexistence between the state and tribal sovereigns, with each responsi-
ble for various parts of the checkerboard territory.38
modem technology. See also United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 402 (W.D. Wash.
1974) (treaty interpreted as encompassing improvements developed in traditional fishing tech-
niques); Comment, State Power and the Indian Treaty Right to Fish, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 485, 522
(1971).
30. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 332 n.12 (W.D. Wash. 1974); State v.
Sanapaw, 21 Wis. 2d 377, 383, 124 N.W.2d 41, 44 (1963), cited with approval/in Menominee Tribe
of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 n.2 (1968).
31. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894 (1982); Quechan Tribe of Indians v.
Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1976) ("In the absence of treaty provisions or congressional
pronouncements to the contrary, the tribe has the inherent power to exclude non-members from
the reservation."); Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 1975).
32. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894, 901, 904 (1982); Washington v. Confed-
erated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 165-66 (1980); United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 120-47.
34. See infira text accompanying notes 177-85.
35. Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1982)).
36. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001, 1006 (D. Minn.
1971). The Supreme Court has agreed that subsequent alienation of reservation lands can destroy
the once exclusive character of Indian hunting and fishing rights on the reservation. See Montana
v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559-61 (1981) and infra text accompanying notes 127-47.
37. In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983), the Court confirmed
that the sole power to regulate on-reservation hunting and fishing rested with the tribe. The Court
noted that only 193 acres of the 460,000 acre Mescalero reservation had passed to non-Indian
ownership, id. at 2381, while in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 548 (1981), 28% of the
reservation land was owned by non-Indians. Though the Mescalero tribe generally could exclude
non-Indians from the reservation, it presumably must allow the non-Indian landowner access to
his land. See F. COHEN, supra note 4, at 252 & n.86.
38. The result of the holding in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 554 (1981), has been the
creation of a dual checkerboard pattern of hunting and fishing jurisdiction, requiring a plat book
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2. Off-Reservation Hunting and Fishing-To What Does the Right
Attach?
An assertion of off-reservation Indian hunting and fishing rights fre-
quently involves a dispute with non-Indians over valuable commercial or rec-
reational hunting and fishing that otherwise would be subject to the state's
broad powers to control game and wildlife within its borders. The most
fiercely contested claims of off-reservation hunting and fishing rights have fo-
cused on the treaties between the United States and various tribes of the Pa-
cific Northwest. The tribes had reserved "the right of taking fish at all usual
and accustomed places, in common with citizens of the Territory. ... -39 In
three early cases concerning disputed Indian claims of rights protected by that
treaty language, the Supreme Court laid to rest the contention that the phrase
limited Indian fishing rights to those enjoyed by any other inhabitant of the
territory.
In United States v. Winans40 the United States sought to enjoin landown-
ers who were preventing treaty Indians from crossing their land to reach a
"usual and accustomed" fishing site. Because the Indians' adversaries ad-
vanced a construction of the treaty that would have limited the Indians to the
same rights they had without the treaty, the Court rejected the interpretation
as rendering the treaty a nullity. Instead, the Court concluded that the treaty
secured not only the right to fish, but also a right of access to all "usual and
accustomed" sites.41 Fourteen years later, in Seufert Brothers Co. v. United
States,42 the Court held that "usual and accustomed" must be construed
broadly, to include both the natural meaning of the word and the Indians'
probable understanding at the time of the treaty, as reflected in their actions
after the treaty. Subsequently, in Tulee v. Washington,43 the Court invalidated
the state's attempt to impose a license fee on Indians fishing at one of the
treaty-protected sites, concluding that such a fee "act[s] upon the Indians as a
charge for exercising the very right their ancestors intended to reserve." 44 The
Court thus established the framework of analysis for later battles over fishing
rights in the Northwest; taken together, Seufert, Winans, and Tulee articulated
the important rule that off-reservation treaty guarantees will be construed
to determine the owner of the land, and an identification of the person sought to be regulated
before the proper regulatory power, tribal or state, can be identified. Tribal members are subject
solely to tribal control anywhere within the reservation, whereas nonmembers are subject to state
regulation on non-Indian lands and tribal regulation on all lands owned by the tribe, an Indian, or
the United States. See infra text accompanying notes 127-47. The Court thus has exacerbated the
"impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction" it deplored in Seymour v. Superintendent of
Wash., 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962).
39. Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, United States-Nisqually Tribe, 10 Stat. 1132.
For a list of all treaties with tribes in the Pacific Northwest in which similar rights were reserved,
see United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 313, 349 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aft'd, 520 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
40. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
41. Id. at 384.
42. 249 U.S. 194, 198-99 (1919).
43. 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
44. Id. at 685.
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broadly to effectuate the probable understanding of the signatory tribe and to
provide protection from state regulation that impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of treaty-protected rights.
In the late 1960s these off-reservation fishing rights formed the basis for a
broad challenge to the states' ability to limit Indian fishing at the "usual and
accustomed" sites. Beginning with Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game,
(Puyallup -)45 and continuing to the present, courts have struggled to ensure
ample protection of Indian treaty rights while recognizing legitimate state con-
servation interests. Though most of the cases in this series have focused on the
state's ability to regulate Indians in the exercise of their treaty rights,46 defin-
ing the off-reservation right was a necessary preliminary issue. In United
States v. Washington47 the federal district court construed the "in common
with" language as guaranteeing the Indians the right to catch up to fifty per-
cent of the "harvestable runs" of salmon and steelhead trout that passed
through usual and accustomed fishing sites.48 The Supreme Court subse-
quently found several justifications for construing the treaty language as estab-
lishing a division of harvestable fish into approximately equal treaty and
nontreaty shares. 49 Starting with the established rules of Seufert, Winans, and
Tulee, the Court reiterated that "[n]ontreaty fishermen may not rely on prop-
erty law concepts, devices such as the fish wheel, license fees, or general regu-
lations to deprive the Indians of a fair share of the .. .available fish."50
Rather, in construing treaties that guarantee off-reservation hunting or fishing
rights, a court must define those rights by considering the facts surrounding
the treaty negotiations and the Indians' probable expectations at the time the
treaty was signed, as gleaned from evidence of the tribe's way of life. More-
over, the Court emphasized, modem delineation of the treaty share must en-
45. 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
The controversy remains far from settled, notwithstanding three subsequent Supreme Court
cases, Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup II), Puyallup Tribe,
Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup III), and Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); two lengthy district court
orders, United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), and United States v.
Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash. 1978), and various state court and federal circuit
court decisions. See Comment, Indian Fishing Rights Return to Spawn: Toward Environmental
Protection of Treaty Fisheries, 61 OR. L. REv. 93 (1982); Note, Treaties: Fishing Rights in the
Pacc Northwest-7he Supreme Court 'egislates" an Equitable Solution, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
117 (1980).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 153-75.
47. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), ajt'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1086 (1976).
48. Steelhead trout and salmon are anadromous fish, that is, they batch in fresh water, mi-
grate to the ocean, and return to their place of origin to spawn. Their "runs" are predictable;
moreover, a certain "escapement" number of fish must be allowed to ensure perpetuation of the
runs for future years. For each run of a particular fish, the available harvest can be calculated
with reasonable certainty to allow sufficient escapement. Because fish constitute a valuable com-
mercial resource, and because they may pass through several states, Indian reservations, off-reser-
vation treaty fishing sites, and international waters, the jurisdictional problems are particularly
complex. See generally United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
49. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 671 (1979).
50. Id. at 684-85.
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sure adequate protection of the Indians' current "reasonable livelihood
needs."' 51 Because Indians constituted three-fourths of the population of the
Pacific Northwest when the treaties were signed, and depended heavily on
fishing for food and income, the Supreme Court found the logic of the district
court's apportionment to be "manifest." 52
In more recent litigation, parties have continued to dispute the proper
means of calculating the number of fish to which the off-reservation treaty
right attaches. The Ninth Circuit held that the nontreaty share of harvestable
fish includes only fish to which nontreaty fishermen have access. 53 Thus, the
court found that the district court properly rejected the state's argument that
nontreaty fishermen were entitled to fifty percent of a run that had originated
and remained on the reservation. Computation of the number of fish to which
each group is entitled, then, excludes fish that never proceed upstream enough
to leave the reservation. Several months later, the same court ruled that the
state must include fish raised in hatcheries when defining the harvestable run
to which the treaty fishermen's fifty percent right attaches.54 The state argued
that the tribes' treaty rights extended only to the natural fish run that passed
the off-reservation fishing sites, and contended that it had no obligation to
subsidize Indian treaty rights by guaranteeing tribal access to hatchery fish.
The Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments primarily on the basis that the
state can assert no ownership interest in the fish once they are released. In
addition, the court noted the practical impossibilities of distinguishing natural
fish from hatchery fish. Moreover, the court concluded, because the natural
fishery was destroyed at least in part by non-Indian fishing and degradation of
the environment, the state's hatchery fish constituted the modern substitute of
the treaty right to natural fish.55
Other courts have been the forum for similar, though perhaps less spec-
tacular, litigation requiring definition of the scope of off-reservation hunting
and fishing rights guaranteed by treaty. In some cases, courts have defined the
geographic area in which the reserved rights may be exercised;56 in others, the
dispute has centered on whether the treaty included an implied reservation of
51. Id. at 685.
52. Id. at 686 n.27. The Court also noted the compelling logic behind the district court's 50-
50 apportionment: "For an equal division--especially between parties who presumptively treated
with each other as equals--is suggested, if not necessarily dictated, by the word 'common' as it
appears in the treaties. Since the days of Solomon, such a division has been accepted as a fair
apportionment of a common asset. . . ." Id. The Court, however, did modify the manner in
which the treaty share would be calculated, ruling that all fish caught by the Indians, regardless of
where caught, would be included in the computation of the treaty share. Id. at 687. Thus, the
Court reversed the district court's exclusion of fish caught on the reservation and fish caught for
ceremonial purposes.
53. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1982) (Couby, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983).
54. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982), withdrawnfor reh ' en banc,
704 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983).
55. Id. at 1378. The state based its argument in part on Justice White's concurrence in De-
partment of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 49-50 (1973) (Puyallup I1), in which Justice
White stipulated that the treaty rights extended only to the natural fish run.
56. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
1984]
NORTH CAROLINA L4W REVIEW
hunting and fishing rights; 57 in still others, courts have determined whether a
particular group was entitled to the protection of off-reservation treaty
rights.58 All of these cases confirmed the well-established rule that the treaties
constituted a grant from the tribe to the federal government and a reservation
of all rights not ceded,59 and thus must be construed broadly to reflect the
intentions and understanding of the signatory tribe.
Several disputes have arisen over treaty language reserving to the tribe
the rights to hunt and fish "on open and unclaimed land." Because the tribes
could have reserved their aboriginal hunting and fishing rights only on lands
on which they actually hunted and fished at the time of the treaty, the prelimi-
nary inquiry must determine whether the area allegedly protected by the
treaty formed part of the tribe's aboriginal territory. The court then must de-
termine how subsequent dispositions of the land have affected treaty rights;
that is, it must decide if the challenged geographical area has remained "open
and unclaimed." Indian off-reservation treaty rights continue unless the land
has been settled by non-Indians or otherwise reduced to private ownership.60
A court could find that an express reservation of off-reservation rights was
not limited to the territory specifically mentioned in the treaty. The Supreme
Court of Michigan found that a treaty provision reserving Indian rights to
hunt and fish on territory ceded to the United States guaranteed the right to
fish in waters that were not part of the ceded territory. In People v. JondreaU6t
the state argued that the tribe's 1854 treaty retained no right to fish in naviga-
ble waters, because title to those waters previously had vested in the state
when it entered the Union in 1837. Thus, the state contended that the treaty
language reserving fishing rights in territory "hereby ceded" in 1854 did not
protect the right to fish in state waters. Rejecting the state's argument and
instead looking at the "substance of the right, without regard to technical
rules,"'62 the court concluded that the right to fish on ceded territory must be
extended to waters under state sovereignty at the time the treaty was signed:
"Any other construction of the treaty would make the right granted by the
treaty without substance. '63
Even if the treaty contains no express stipulation for off-reservation hunt-
ing and fishing, a court nevertheless may imply a tribal reservation of those
57. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
59. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
60. Thus, treaty rights extend to national forests and all other lands still held by the federal
government. State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953). See also State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho
759, 764, 497 P.2d 1386, 1391 (1972).
61. 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375 (1971).
62. Id. at 544, 185 N.W.2d at 377.
63. Id. at 545, 185 N.W.2d at 378. Congress' power to give federal recognition to off-reserva-
tion treaty rights on state owned territory appears well established. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920). But see Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323, 1333-35 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3537 (1983), in which the Seventh Circuit expressed doubt that Congress could limit state sover-
eignty in this way.
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rights. In United States v. Michigan64 the federal district court recognized tri-
bal off-reservation fishing rights in treaties that ceded huge parcels of Indian
aboriginal territory and established reservations for the displaced tribes, even
though the treaty made no mention of off-reservation rights. The court found
that the choice of the reservation's location, land near traditional fishing
grounds, suggested that the Indians had intended to continue exercising their
aboriginal fishing rights. In addition, the court drew a negative inference from
the United States' failure to extract a release of fishing rights from the Indi-
ans.65 Moreover, certain treaty provisions, especially one granting the Indians
a yearly entitlement of salt barrels to promote the tribe's fish-preserving en-
deavors, confirmed that all parties to the treaties had expected the Indians to
pursue their off-reservation fishing to the same extent as before the treaty. On
balance, the court did not believe that the Indians had signed a treaty with the
understanding that it would make their way of life impossible.
66
Once a court determines that an Indian tribe has retained express or im-
plied rights to hunt and fish at sites off the reservation, the protection of fed-
eral recognition attaches. The Indians acquire rights superior to non-Indian
citizens, whose hunting and fishing rights may be conditioned and extensively
regulated by the state.67 Moreover, off-reservation hunting and fishing rights
embody more than the right to dip a net or hook into the water; the state has
an affirmative duty to ensure the availability of a fair share of game and wild-
64. 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 623 F.2d 448 (6th Cir.
1980).
65. The United States could have extracted a relinquishment of aboriginal hunting and fish-
ing rights if it had intended to limit Indian fishing. See, e.g., Treaty with the Winnebagoes, Sept.
15, 1832, United States-Winnebago Tribe, 7 Stat. 370, cited in United States v. Michigan, 471 F.
Supp. at 234.
66. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. at 231. If the treaty had specifically ceded those
rights, the court would have been powerless to rewrite the treaty. As the Supreme Court noted in
Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943): "But even Indian treaties cannot be
re-written or expanded beyond their clear terms to remedy a claimed injustice or to achieve the
asserted understanding of the parties."
Other courts have found similar evidence of implied retention of off-reservation fishing
rights. In State v. Gurnoe, 53 Wis. 2d 390, 192 N.W.2d 892 (1972), the court implied those rights
on the basis of language creating a reservation "for the use" of the tribe, when the historical
research revealed that the tribe had enjoyed an uninterrupted 300 years of fishing in the disputed
waters and that this tradition had continued unmodified after the signing of the treaty. See also
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.
1983), in which the court reached the same conclusion as to reserved off-reservation fishing rights,
but with a slightly different analysis. The issue before the court in Lac Courte Oreilies was
whether the tribe had reserved fishing rights on huge tracts of land ceded pursuant to two prede-
cessor treaties, signed in 1837 and 1842. Thus, the tribe's claims were much broader than those
asserted in Gurnoe, in which the court was dealing with reserved fishing rights on smaller portions
of land ceded in a later treaty. The Lac Courte Oreilles court concluded that express reservation
of fishing rights in the 1837 and 1842 treaties had never been abrogated. Id. at 364-65. Similarly,
in State v. Lowe, 109 Wis. 2d 633, 327 N.W.2d 166 (Ct. App. 1982), the court found adequate
expression of intent to reserve off-reservation fishing rights in evidence that the tribe historically
had fished in the waters and that the land was bought by the United States as a reservation pre-
cisely because of the importance of tribal fishing. Id. at 639, 327 N.W.2d at 169. Moreover, an
express reservation of the right to hunt off the reservation has been construed as encompassing the
right to fish as well.
67. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
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life to treaty fishermen.68 Recently, a tribe asserted that off-reservation rights
protected by treaty embody an affirmative right to prevent the state from mis-
managing its resources.69 Although no court of appeals has yet confirmed this
asserted environmental right, the Supreme Court's admonition that a state
may not rely on its regulatory powers to defeat a tribe's treaty right7" suggests
that the tribe and the federal government have the power to prevent action
that would dissipate the resource to which the treaty right attaches.
3. Parties Entitled to Exercise Treaty Rights
Judicial confirmation of treaty-protected hunting and fishing rights and
the delineation of the territory or resources to which they apply may not put
an end to litigation over the scope of the rights. In some cases, courts must
determine if a particular claimant is entitled to exercise the treaty guarantee.
Indians asserting claims to off-reservation treaty rights must establish that
their group has preserved its tribal status. The group need not have acquired
an organizational structure it did not have when the treaty was signed;7 1 nor
will a continual evolution of tribal policy and structure prove fatal to its claim.
For treaty rights to endure, however, a "defining characteristic" of the original
tribe must persist.72
Although federal recognition of the tribe is not a prerequisite to the con-
tinued vitality of treaty rights, a total lack of political and cultural cohesion
will deprive the group of the ability to assert entitlement to the exercise of
those rights. In United States v. Washington73 the Ninth Circuit upheld the
district court's finding that descendants of members of treaty-signatory tribes
had not functioned since treaty times as " 'continuous[ly] separate, distinct and
cohesive Indian cultural or political communit[ies].' ,,74 The court held the
groups ineligible for off-reservation treaty rights. Similarly, Withdrawn mem-
68. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 678-79 (1979). On that basis the Ninth Circuit, in Washington State Charterboat Ass'n v.
Baldridge, 702 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 736 (1984), rejected the non-
Indians' argument that the "run by run" approach used to allocate the salmon harvest should be
substituted by an "aggregate" calculation, based on percentages of the entire available harvest.
The non-Indians argued that the run by run approach forces an early halt to each year's ocean
catch by nontreaty fishermen, at which point the runs are indistinguishable. Because the aggre-
gate approach would not ensure that a tribe received its share of each particular run, but rather
only would guarantee that 50% of the total available harvest was preserved for treaty fishermen,
the court refused to modify the method of computation.
69. The Ninth Circuit orginally rejected that assertion in United States v. Washington, 694
F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982). The opinion was withdrawn and the case accepted for rehearing en
bane. 704 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983). See generally Comment, supra note 45; Note, United States
v. Washington (Phase II): The Indian Fishing Conflict Moves Upstream, 12 ENVTL. L. 469 (1982).
70. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 682 (1979).
71. White negotiators frequently imputed to the loose knit Indian groups a tribal structure
they did not have. As the Ninth Circuit noted: "A structure that never existed cannot be 'main-
tained.'" United States v. Washington, 641 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1143 (1982).
72. Id. at 1372.
73. Id. at 1368.
74. Id. at 1373 (citing United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101, 1110 (W.D. Wash.
1979)).
[Vol. 62
TRIBAL HUNTING & FISHING RIGHTS
bers of a tribe cannot claim an entitlement to treaty-protected hunting and
fishing rights.75
4. Loss of Treaty Hunting and Fishing Rights
Congress has plenary power to unilaterally abrogate treaty rights, 76 sub-
ject to the constitutional limitation requiring just compensation for depriva-
tion of property rights. Treaty hunting and fishing rights constitute property
rights entitling the holders to just compensation when those rights are abol-
ished by congressional action.77 The courts, however, are reluctant to impute
congressional intent to abrogate treaty rights in the absence of explicit state-
ment. In Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States78 the Supreme Court
refused to find that a federal statute terminating the Menominee Tribe79 also
destroyed the tribe's hunting and fishing rights. The Termination Act's pri-
mary purpose was to end federal supervision over the tribe's property and
members. The Court found no expression of congressional intent to violate
any treaty obligation of the United States to the tribe. Concluding that tribal
hunting and fishing rights had survived the Termination Act, the Court cau-
tioned against construing congressional action "as a backhanded way of abro-
gating [Indian] hunting and fishing rights ....
Following the Menominee Court's clear and emphatic language, a federal
district court concluded that construction of a dam specifically authorized by
Congress would impermissibly destroy treaty hunting and fishing rights with-
out express congressional intent. Because Congress had authorized the project
before the off-reservation treaty rights were established, the court refused to
conclude that Congress had authorized the taking of treaty rights.81 Thus, it
held that construction of the dam could not proceed unless Congress mani-
fested a clear intent to abrogate. The court correctly refused to infer congres-
sional intent from a general project authorization, especially since the Act
predated confirmation of the existence of the off-reservation fishing rights.
Abrogation of treaty-protected hunting and fishing rights, however, does
75. State v. Bojorcas, 14 Or. App. 538, 513 P.2d 813 (1973).
76. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-67 (1903). Although judicial review of fed-
eral legislation passed pursuant to this plenary power traditionally has been very narrow, the
Supreme Court has indicated that it is moving towards a more searching review. See Comment,
Federal Plenary Power in Indian Affairs After Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 235
(1982).
77. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968); Shoshone Tribe
v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
78. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
79. Menominee Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 399-303, 68 Stat. 250 (1954) (repealed 1973).
With the termination policy of the 1950s, congressional intent to abolish reservation life had resur-
faced once more. See F. CoHiEN, supra note 4, at 152-80; Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the
Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDiA4 L. REv. 139 (1977).
80. Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 412. At least one court has suggested that aboriginal title is
more easily destroyed than federally recognized title. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 352-53 (7th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Besadny v. Lac
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 104 S. Ct. 53 (1983).
81. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553
(D. Or. 1977).
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not always require express congressional language. An Indian agreement to
"grant, cede, relinquish and convey to the United States all our right, title, and
interest in land" was found to establish intent sufficient to infer that the tribe
had relinquished its hunting and fishing rights.82 Similarly, in Blake v. Ar-
netts3 the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress had intended that land
within the reservation borders conveyed to non-Indians pursuant to the Allot-
ment Act would not be encumbered by any hunting and fishing rights that
otherwise might be implied on reservation lands.s4 Distinguishing United
States v. Wnans,8 5 in which the Supreme Court had found that the sale of the
land to non-Indians had not extinguished off-reservation treaty rights, the
Ninth Circuit emphasized that the fishing rights in Winans were protected ex-
pressly by treaty.86 In Blake, however, the court found that congressional au-
thorization of the sale of reservation lands to non-Indians constituted sufficient
evidence of intent to extinguish Indian hunting and fishing rights s7 In sum,
although an explicit congressional statement is not necessary to a finding of
abrogation, courts require convincing evidence that Congress considered and
intended that its action would destroy rights guaranteed by treaty.
II. INDIAN REGULATION OF HUNTING AND FISHING
A. Tribal Sovereignty. Source of the Power to Regulate Hunting and Fishing
Tribal sovereignty in its pristine, prediscovery form encompassed the full
panoply of powers held by all self-governing, sovereign, political communi-
ties.88 Conquest and the subsequent incorporation of tribes into the territorial
boundaries of the United States, however, subjected the tribal sovereigns to
the plenary power of the conqueror. As of that moment, the tribes implicitly
82. United States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Minn. 1979), a4dper cur/am sub n.
Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 614 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
905 (1980); see also State v. Hero, 282 N.W.2d 70 (S.D. 1979).
83. 663 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1981).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 126-47 for a discussion of the effect of non-Indian
ownership within the reservation on tribal sovereignty over its territory.
85. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
86. As the court itself recognized, however, the right to fish on the reservation probably was
taken for granted by all at the time of the treaty, and it "did not occur to anyone" to mention
fishing rights. Because rights reasonably implied from treaty language are entitled to the same
protection as other treaty rights, Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. 404, the absence of express mention
of the right should not make abrogation easier to infer. Hobbs, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights
II, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1251, 1270 (1969).
87. In comparison, the off-reservation land in Winans appears never to have constituted part
of a reservation. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that, at the time the treaty was signed, Congress
intended that the off-reservation hunting and fishing sites would one day pass into private owner-
ship.
The Supreme Court has not decided whether the sale of reservation lands to non-Indians
extinguishes treaty hunting and fishing rights on those lands. It has indicated, though, that Indian
claims of treaty rights on private land "would raise serious questions." Antoine v. Washington,
420 U.S. 194, 207 n.11 (1975); compare id at 212 (Douglas, J., concurring). In addition, the Court
has construed the allotment acts as generally divesting the tribe of its sovereignty over reservation
lands conveyed to non-Indians. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559 n.9 (1981).
88. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); MeClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973).
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were divested, by virtue of their new dependent status, of any aspect of sover-
eignty that would conflict with the overriding sovereignty of the conquering
nation.8 9 Moreover, the federal government acquired the exclusive and abso-
lute power to modify or abrogate any aspect of tribal sovereignty not implic-
itly divested.90 Thus, retained tribal sovereignty continues to exist "at the
sufferance of Congress,. . . subject to complete defeasance." 91
Early federal Indian policy recognized a retained sovereignty in its
"starkest territorial conception"; 92 Indian affairs were contemplated as within
the sole province of the federal government.93 This "conceptual clarity" 94 di-
minished as contact between Indians and non-Indians increased and as con-
gressional policy sought to accommodate legitimate state interests in certain
aspects of reservation life.95 Moreover, the scope of tribal sovereignty was
modified further by frequent congressional fluctuations between affirmation of
tribal self-government and avowed attempts to end tribal life by forced or en-
couraged assimilation into mainstream American culture. 96 However congres-
sional policy may change, the judicial analysis remains constant: tribes retain
all aspects of sovereignty not implicitly divested by their dependent status un-
less such sovereignty is surrendered by treaty or is inconsistent with congres-
sional intent.97
Defining the contours of federally sanctioned tribal sovereignty, subject to
89. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
90. The Supreme Court has noted several sources of Congress's plenary control over tribal
sovereignty, including the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217, 219 n.4 (1959); the political consensus that produced the federal government, which
contemplated that one central body, as opposed to the individual states, would deal with the
tribes, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832); and the duty of protection that arose
from the federal government's dealings with the tribes, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
383 (1886). Thus, although Congress is not the source of tribal sovereignty, United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978), the continued existence of the tribal sovereignty depends
purely on congressional policy. Treaties between the federal government and Indian tribes gener-
ally reflect congressional confirmation of retained tribal sovereignty, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217, 221 (1959). See also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. CL 2378 (1983); Fisher
v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386-87 (1976). As the Supreme Court noted in United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1904), treaties represent only a limitation of aboriginal tribal sover-
eignty; all sovereign rights not ceded to the federal government are retained by implication.
91. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
92. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 165
n.1 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
93. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 514, 540-44 (1832).
94. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
95. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1973). See White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141-43 for a discussion of the evolution of the
tribal sovereignty doctrine.
96. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 4, at 47-206; D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELDT, & C.
WIKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 29-119 (1979); M. PRICE & R.
CLINTON, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 68-91 (2d ed. 1983).
97. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153
(1980); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-09 (1978); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978). Similarly, tribal sovereignty may be augmented by congres-
sional action. Thus, although the tribe may have lost a particular sovereign power, either implic-
itly or by congressional action, congressional delegation of that power will authorize tribal
assertion of a previously lost aspect of sovereignty. Oiphant, 435 U.S. at 212; United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
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Congress' ability to modify or abrogate at will, is necessarily a synchronic in-
quiry reflecting current congressional policy. In several important areas,
though, the limits of tribal sovereignty are defined not by the extent to which
the current Congress encourages tribal self government, but rather by the doc-
trine of implicit divestiture. That doctrine recognizes that some aspects of tri-
bal sovereignty were necessarily lost when the tribe incorporated within a
larger sovereign; an Indian tribe could not exercise power that would threaten
the overriding sovereignty of the federal government. 98 Judicial decisions
finding implicit divestiture have emphasized repeatedly the inconsistency be-
tween the asserted tribal power and the very concept of a federal sovereign. In
Johnson v. M'Intosh,99 for example, the Court found that incorporation into
the United States had divested Indians of the power to convey their aboriginal
title to land. This loss of sovereignty was necessitated by the principle "that
discovery gave title to the . . . government by whose authority it was
made."' ° Worcester v. Georgia'0 1 highlighted the tribes' loss of power to
enter into foreign affairs and noted that the "irresistible power" of the con-
queror "excluded [the tribes] from intercourse with any other European poten-
tate."102 More recently, the Court found implicit divestiture of the tribe's
power to impose criminal sanctions on a nonmember, basing its holding in
part on the shared assumption of all branches of government that tribes bad
no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and partly on the overriding federal
interests in safeguarding the procedural rights of criminal defendants. 10 3
Thus, to determine whether a tribe has been implicitly divested of a sovereign
power a court must determine whether the exercise of tribal sovereignty would
be inconsistent with overriding federal interests. 1 4
Loosely defined, and in the absence of implicit divestiture or congres-
sional modification or abrogation, the tribes' retained powers of sovereignty
include all instruments of self-government and territorial management avail-
98. Thus, barring express congressional delegation of power, a judicial finding of implied
divestiture will not be reversed by subsequent changes in general congressional Indian policy.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). To some extent, too, the doctrine
of implicit divestiture is constitutionally required. Congressional delegation of power to Indian
tribes must be within the parameters imposed by the delegation doctrine. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERiCAN CONST17UTMONAL LAW 284-91 (1978). The delegation doctrine may be acquiring re-
newed importance in constitutional law. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 676-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
99. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823).
100. Id. at 573; see also id at 573, 578, 582.
101. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1831).
102. Id. at 542.
103. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
104. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153
(1980). The Colville Court stressed that "tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to,
only the Federal Government, not the States." Id. at 154. See Collins, Implied Limitations on the
Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REv. 479 (1979). In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544 (1981), the Court appeared to expand the doctrine beyond its previously established limits.
See infra text accompanying notes 132-33.
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able to any sovereign.' 5 Thus, tribal sovereignty encompasses tribal control
over members and territory. 106 Since the continued legitimacy of any retained
sovereign power depends on federal recognition, any assertion of tribal sover-
eignty requires careful analysis to determine consistency with congressional
intent. Thus, for example, in Kennerly v. District Court 10 7 the Supreme Court
examined federal legislation defining the procedure by which a tribe could
consent to state jurisdiction and concluded that the statutorily defined proce-
dure was intended to be exclusive. To that extent, then, tribal sovereignty had
been limited by explicit congressional legislation. In most other disputes con-
cerning the validity of tribal assertions of power, no federal statute is directly
relevant. In those cases, the court starts with the premise of congressional con-
firmation of all aspects of sovereignty not otherwise released by treaty, implic-
itly divested, or abrogated by Congress. To determine whether the asserted
tribal power fits within the limits of congressionally sanctioned tribal sover-
eignty, the court surveys general Indian legislation to see if the exercise of
tribal sovereignty is consistent with federal policy. Since the 1960s, Congress
steadfastly has encouraged tribal self-governance and self-sufficiency.108 This
congressional confirmation of retained tribal sovereignty provides an impor-
tant gauge in judicial evaluations of the legitimacy of a tribe's asserted powers.
On that basis the Supreme Court has upheld a tribe's asserted power to crimi-
nally prosecute its members,' °9 to impose taxes on non-Indians who engage in
on-reservation activities, 1 0 to determine tribal membership,"' and to define
the rules of property inheritance." 2 Thus, although federal Indian policy
early abandoned the notion that tribes within the United States constituted
semi-independent nations totally beyond the reach of state law, tribal sover-
eignty remains a vital aspect of Indian law: it is the yardstick by which to
measure the validity of tribal assertions of control over its members and its
territory. 113
B. Tribal Sovereignty over Member Hunting and Fishing
Tribal power to regulate the on-reservation hunting and fishing activities
of its members is undisputed; 114 the allocation of rights associated with on-
reservation resources neatly fits within Congress' confirmation of retained tri-
105. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982); United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
106. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152
(1980).
107. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 255-69.
109. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
110. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). Cf. Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 462 (1976) (state attempts to tax on-reservation Indians).
111. See The Cherokee ntermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906).
112. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899).
113. Unfortunately, courts frequently have attributed to tribal sovereignty a much more ex-
pansive power. See infra text accompanying notes 245-50.
114. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378, 2384 (1983).
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bal power to regulate "internal [affairs] and social relations."1I s Pursuant to
that authority, various tribes have adopted game and wildlife codes that con-
trol the time, place, and manner of member hunting and fishing. Violations of
tribal codes may subject members to the criminal jurisdiction of tribal
courts.
1 16
Moreover, because the exercise of off-reservation treaty hunting and fish-
ing rights implicates federally protected tribal rights specifically reserved by
the tribe, tribal sovereignty over members is not limited to activity within the
reservation borders. The locus of the act is not conclusive; rather, judicial
inquiry focuses on whether the disputed assertion of tribal power would pro-
tect the tribe's legitimate interest in self-government. 1 7 Express treaty lan-
guage guaranteeing off-reservation hunting or fishing rights confirms the
tribe's reservation of the power to control the exercise of that right."18 Re-
served hunting and fishing rights are communal, tribal rights; thus, regulation
of the exercise of those rights is an internal tribal matter reserved to the tribe
as sovereign. 19
C. Tribal Sovereignty over Nonmembers Hunting and Fishing on the
Reservation
Because the territorial component is an important aspect of retained tribal
115. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,382 (1886). A finding that the tribe has the power
to regulate does not in and of itself preclude state regulation. A state may regulate in those areas
within the competence of tribal power, and thus derogate tribal sovereignty, if it can establish,
among other things, a significant regulatory interest and a substantial off-reservation nexus with
the object of regulation. See infra notes 152-76 and accompanying text.
116. See Puyallup Tribe v. Starr-Moses, 10 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING
PROGRAM) 6028 (Puyallup Tribal Ct. 1983).
117. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 687 (1979); Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986
(1965).
118. Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th. Cir. 1974); United States v. Felter, 546 F. Supp.
1002, 1024 (D. Utah 1982).
119. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 236 (9th Cir. 1974): "It
would be unreasonable to conclude that in reserving these vital [off-reservation] rights, the Indians
intended to divest themselves of all control over the exercise of those rights." Thus, the court
denied the tribal members' petition for habeas corpus and upheld the tribal court's imposition of
fines and penalties for violations of the tribe's hunting and fishing code. Moreover, the court
upheld defendant's arrest by tribal authorities, which had taken place off the reservation.
Even in the absence of a tribal enforcement mechanism, federal prosecution of an Indian for
violation of his tribe's hunting and fishing code under federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982), was
found invalid in United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979). Finding no evidence of
congressional intent to supplant the tribe's sovereign powers, the court denied federal jurisdiction
over Indians violating a tribal ordinance on the reservation. Though the Lacey Act Amendments
of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1982), now make a violation of a tribal ordinance a federal
crime, the question in future cases raising this issue still will be whether Congress intended to
confer federal jurisdiction over tribal hunting and fishing. Although the legislative history is si-
lent, see S. Rep. No. 123, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-28, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD.
NEws 1748; H.R. RaP. No. 276, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-42 (1981), express congressional intent to
supplement state and tribal powers to achieve maximum enforcement of applicable fish and game
conservation laws would appear to apply to any violator of a tribal hunting and fishing code. In
that respect, the federal trespass statute is siginficantly different. As the Jackson court noted,
Congress' main concern in passing that law was to provide a penalty to non-Indian violators of
tribal hunting and fishing ordinances who otherwise were not subject to tribal law. 600 F.2d at
1287.
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sovereignty, 120 a tribe may condition nonmembers' right to enter Indian lands
on compliance with tribal hunting and fishing codes.1 21 Although tribes can-
not impose criminal sanctions on nonmembers,122 violations of tribal ordi-
nances are punishable by expulsion or exclusion from the reservation. 123
Moreover, a federal trespass statute1 24 and the Lacey Act Amendments 25
make violations of a tribal conservation ordinance a violation of federal law.
Although it is firmly established that a tribe has authority to regulate non-
member hunting and fishing on land held in trust by the United States for
Indians and on land owned in fee by a tribe or by an individual tribal mem-
ber, recent cases have challenged the tribe's power to regulate non-Indian ac-
tivities on land within the reservation borders owned in fee by a non-
Indian.126 In Montana v. United States 2 7 the Supreme Court held that Indian
sovereignty over nonmembers generally is limited to the regulation of activi-
ties occurring on land owned by Indians or held by the United States for them;
thus, the Court reversed the court of appeals' holding that the hunting and
fishing ordinances of the Crow tribe applied to non-Indian activities on fee
lands within the reservation.
The court of appeals had confirmed tribal sovereignty over fee land on
two bases: that Congress had intended to extend tribal jurisdiction to fee lands
within the reservation; and that the tribe had retained its inherent sovereign
powers to regulate all hunting and fishing activities on the reservation, regard-
less of the ownership of that land.128 With regard to the first prong of the
Ninth Circuit's holding, the Court reviewed the possible sources of delegated
power and found no congressional intent to confirm tribal power over non-
Indian land. The Court agreed that an 1868 treaty with the Crow tribe, estab-
lishing a reservation for the "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of
the Indians," had "arguably conferred upon the Tribe the authority to control
fishing and hunting on those lands."' 129 Nevertheless, the Court concluded
that, whatever the extent of tribal power reserved by the 1868 treaty, it did not
120. See Merrion v. Jiearilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137, 142 (1982).
121. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378, 2385 (1983).
122. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
123. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct 2378, 2391 n.27 (1983).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982).
125. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1982).
126. See, e.g., Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973). In any case in which reservation land has
been sold to non-Indians, the initial inquiry focuses on the termination issue; that is, whether the
circumstances surrounding the sale of lands compel the conclusion that the reservation has been
terminated. Reservation status may survive the sale of reservation lands; a court will not lightly
conclude that an Indian reservation has been terminated. "[Clongressional determination to ter-
minate must be expressed on the face of the [legislation] or be clear from the surrounding circum-
stances and legislative history." Id. at 505. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584
(1977), and De Coteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), for cases finding sufficient
congressional intent to terminate or diminish an Indian reservation. All discussions in this Article
assume continuing reservation status.
127. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
128. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
129. 450 U.S. at 558-59 (citation omitted).
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survive the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887130 and the Crow
Allotment Act of 1920.131
Turning to the second basis for the holding below, the Court disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit's holding that the tribe retained undivested sovereignty
over non-Indian activity on fee lands. Rather, the Court concluded that the
doctrine of implicit divestiture had operated to strip the tribe of this sovereign
power. The Court did not, however, engage in a standard application of im-
plicit divestiture to determine whether the assertion of tribal sovereignty
would be inconsistent with an overriding federal sovereign interest. In a sub-
tle but potentially significant modification of implicit divestiture, the Court
stated that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relationships is inconsistent with
the dependent status of tribes, and so cannot survive without express congres-
sional delegation."' 132 Nevertheless, the Court carefully limited the breadth of
its new formulation of the implicit divestiture theory. The Court specified that
a tribe may exercise its sovereignty over non-Indian lands within the reserva-
tion if activity on these lands "threatens or has some direct effect on the polit-
ical integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." 133
The Montana Court's apparent expansion of the doctrine of implicit di-
vestiture was unnecessary for its holding. As a preliminary matter, the court
of appeals' opinion, though purporting to find two bases for upholding tribal
assertion of jurisdiction on fee lands, merely had stated the same principle
twice. The tribal hunting and fishing code could apply to all land within the
reservation, the court had reasoned, because Congress had authorized this ex-
ercise of tribal sovereignty and, alternatively, because Congress had not
divested the tribe's sovereignty in this area. Stated either way, the sole basis of
130. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1982)). The
allotment system was a complete failure. See Comment, Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs-The
Indian Heirship Land Problem, 46 WASH. L. RIv. 709 (1971).
131. Ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751 (1920).
132. United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. The Ninth Circuit has recognized the
Supreme Court's apparent modification of implicit divestiture. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 963 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 314 (1982). Justices Rehn-
quist and White dissented from the denial of certiorari in this case partially because they believed
the court of appeals had misapplied Montana. 103 S. Ct. at 314 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
Montana Court's definition of implicit divestiture may reflect the Court's decision that any as-
serted tribal power that does not affect the internal relationships of the tribe is inconsistent with
federal sovereignty. But previous and subsequent Court opinions have recognized the tribe's abil-
ity, at least in certain instances, to regulate nonmembers. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
Moreover, the Court in Merrion, a post-Montana decision, returned to the narrower definition of
implicit divestiture: "Only the Federal Government may limit a tribe's exercise of its sovereign
authority." Id. at 147.
133. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. The Court noted that the pleadings had not alleged any im-
pairment of the tribe's reserved hunting and fishing rights. Id. at 558 n.6. Moreover, the Court
found divestiture of tribal sovereignty was justified in this case because "nothing. . . suggests that
such non-Indian hunting and fishing so threaten the Tribe's political or economic security as to
justify tribal regulation. The complaint in the District Court did not allege that non-Indian hunt-
ing and fishing on fee lands imperil the subsistence or welfare of the Tribe." Id. at 566 (footnote
omitted).
[Vol. 62
TRIBAL HUNTING & FISHING -IGHTS
the Ninth Circuit's holding was that tribal sovereignty over fee lands was con-
sistent with congressional intent.
Rather than increase the scope of the doctrine of implicit divestiture, the
Montana Court could have based its holding squarely on congressional intent.
The very existence of fee lands within the borders of Indian reservations is the
result of drastic shifts in congressional Indian policy over short periods of
time. The General Allotment Act of 1887134 contemplated the ultimate disap-
pearance of tribal life by allotting to individual Indians tracts of land that
eventually could be alienated freely; moreover, unallotted tribal land was to
be opened to non-Indian settlement. Congress firmly repudiated its allotment
policy with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act 135 in 1934. By that
time, however, large amounts of tribal land had been transferred to private
ownership. 136 Thus, the determination of congressional intent with regard to
tribal sovereignty over non-Indian lands on the reservation is complicated by
the incomplete realization and subsequent repudiation of the allotment policy.
As an important preliminary matter, though, no federal legislation to date has
repudiated Congress' original confirmation of retained undivested tribal sov-
ereignty over tribal territory that is expressed in the numerous federal treaties
establishing the reservation system itself.137 This consistent congressional pol-
icy should inform any attempt to determine the effect of subsequent congres-
sional action on retained tribal sovereignty.
In its discussion of legislative intent surrounding passage of the General
Allotment Act, the Montana Court noted the following: "It defies common
sense to suppose that Congress would intend that non-Indians purchasing al-
lotted lands would become subject to tribal juridiction when an avowed pur-
pose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal
government."'1 38 While legislative history of the allotment acts admittedly
reveals ample evidence of intent to terminate reservation life, that policy was
repudiated before completion. Because Congress premised its intent to termi-
nate tribal sovereignty on the assumption that tribes themselves would cease to
exist, it is difficult to project that intent onto the current checkerboard pattern
of Indian reservations containing varying amounts of non-Indian land within
their borders. The conclusion that Congress intended the General Allotment
Act to work an automatic divestiture of sovereignty over fee lands is
unwarranted.139
134 . Ch. 119, 24 Stat 388 (1887) (codified as amended at §§ 331-358 (1982)).
135. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982)).
136. Sale of land pursuant to the General Allotment Act reduced Indian holdings from
138,000,000 acres in 1887 to 48,000,000 acres in 1934. Nearly one half of those lands were desert
or semi-desert lands. "Through the allotment system, more that 80 percent of the land value
belonging to all Indians in 1887 has been taken away from them.. . ." Readjustment of Indian
Affairs.: Hearings Before the House Comm on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1934).
137. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 538-39 (1832) (U.S. treaties with
Cherokee tribe confer soveriegn power on Cherokee Nation).
138. 450 U.S. at 560 n.9.
139. The Supreme Court, discussing the effect of the General Allotment Act on continuing
reservation status, an issue not before the Montana Court, stated in Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,
496 (1973) (footnotes omitted): "Its policy was not to continue the reservation system and the trust
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The General Allotment Act's stated purpose was to "improve the condi-
tion of the Indians." 140 Later Congresses repudiated the means adopted by
the allotment acts to achieve that purpose and declared a congressional policy
to reaffirm tribal self-governance, again with the stated goals of protecting the
best interests of the Indians.14 Considered in light of subsequent legislation
reaffirming tribal sovereignty 142 and construed to benefit its stated benefi-
ciaries, the General Allotment Act should be interpreted as having limited the
tribe's sovereignty over territory and members as little as possible. A logical
conclusion, one actually suggested by the Montana Court's holding, is that
alienation of reservation land pursuant to the General Allotment Act abro-
gated tribal sovereignty over that land only to the extent that such abrogation
was consistent with retained tribal sovereignty over lands not sold to non-Indi-
ans. In actual effect, the applicable rule of law reached by evaluating congres-
sional intent is nearly identical to the Montana holding, which admitted
retained tribal sovereignty over fee lands if important tribal sovereign interests
were implicated. The rationale suggested here, however, clarifies that the
scope of retained tribal sovereignty is purely dependent on congressional in-
tent. Moreover, it makes expansion of the doctrine of implicit divestiture
unnecessary. 143
status of Indian lands, but to allot tracts to individual Indians for agriculture and grazing. When
all lands had been allotted and the trust expired, the reservation could be abolished." See also
Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363, 367 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982) (sovereign power continues despite
allotment); Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1150-52 (D. Utah 1981) (legislative
history of General Allotment Act inconclusive).
140. H.R. REP. No. 2247, 48th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1881).
141. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); S. REP. No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1934).
142. See infra notes 256-63 and accompanying text. Although the intent of the Congress that
passed the General Allotment Act must take precedence over the intent of later Congresses, see
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1976), the legis-
lative history of the General Allotment Act reveals that Congress contemplated eventual abolition
of reservation life. Nothing in the legislative history indicates what the enacting Congress would
have intended had it foreseen the checkerboard pattern of territory on Indian reservations that
would result from congressional repudiation of the allotment policy before completion. In that
regard, the Supreme Court's observation in Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S.
572, 596 (1980) (citations omitted), is helpful: "[W]hile the views of subsequent Congresses cannot
override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one, such views are entitled to significant weight,
and particularly so when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure." Accord Andrus
v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980).
143. The mere fact of non-Indian ownership alone does not compel a finding that Congress
intended to divest a tribe of sovereignty. In United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), for
example, the Supreme Court found that treaty hunting and fishing rights continued at off-reserva-
tion sites, unaffected by the fact of private ownership. The tribe also has retained sovereignty over
the exercise of those rights. Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974). See Antoine v. Wash-
ington, 420 U.S. 194, 212 (1975).
The argument that tribal sovereignty should remain coextensive with the reservation bounda-
ries, notwithstanding the existence of non-Indian land, finds some support in the federal statute
extending federal criminal jurisdiction to all land within the reservation borders, 18 U.S.C. § 1511
(1982). Although the statute is applicable on its face only to criminal jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court has noted that the same general intent to bar state jurisdiction on Indian reservations ex-
tends to civil jurisdiction as well. De Coteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2
(1975). Congressional intent to extend federal jurisdiction to the exclusion of state jurisdiction,
however, does not necessarily indicate congressional intent to confer tribal jurisdiction.
Moreover, whatever the general intent reflected in subsequent legislation, treaty guarantees of
sovereignty, once divested, are not revived by general congressional enactments. See White Earth
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In the wake of Montana, several lower federal courts have allowed tribal
regulation of non-Indian activity on non-Indian lands within the reservation
by finding that the activity sought to be regulated affected the tribe's economic
security or political integrity. The Tenth Circuit, for example, upheld the ap-
plicability of the tribe's zoning ordinance to non-Indian lands within the reser-
vation. 144 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a tribe's building code
applied to a non-Indian owner of a grocery store within the reservation. 145
Recently, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a tribal shoreline protection ordinance
regulating riparian structures on Flathead Lake could apply to non-Indian
owners within the reservation. 146 The court concluded that the challenged or-
dinance fell "squarely" within the Montana exception. 147 Because shoreline
activities could pollute the lake water, upset the lake's ecological balance, and
interfere with treaty fishing rights, the court concluded that the non-Indian
conduct affected the tribe's health, welfare, and economic security. It appears,
then, that although the Montana rule unnecessarily buttressed the doctrine of
implicit divestiture, tribal sovereignty will extend to the borders of the reserva-
tion, regardless of the ownership of the land, whenever necessary to further
important tribal interests.
Band of Chippewa Indians v. Alexander, 683 F.2d 1129, 1135-36 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
488 (1982). Thus, if the General Allotment Act extinguished certain aspects of tribal sovereignty,
as this Article suggests, that sovereignty remains extinguished until redelegated by Congress. Re-
gardless of the theoretical basis for finding that tribes have lost some sovereign powers over non-
Indian land within their reservation, the Montana holding creates certain tension with other Court
decisions reaffirming tribal sovereignty over the entire reservation. In New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983), for example, the Court confirmed the tribe's exclusive sover-
eignty over all on-reservation hunting and fishing activities. In Mescalero only 193 acres of a
460,000 acre reservation were privately owned. In Montana, however, the tribe owned only 28%
of the reservation land. It is not clear from the Court's opinions at what point non-Indian owner-
ship will be great enough to require implicit divestiture of tribal sovereignty over alloted lands.
The premises of the Montana holding, however, seem applicable to any situation in which the
state seeks to regulate activities occurring on non-Indian land within the reservation. If the Allot-
ment Act is interpreted along the lines suggested here, as divesting the tribes of only those sover-
eign powers over allotted lands that are unnecessary to protect the tribe's continued sovereignty
over unallotted lands, the tension between Montana and Mescalero is reduced. If a large amount
of reservation land has passed to private ownership, the tribe's retained sovereignty extends to a
correspondingly diminished amount of land. Protection of that retained sovereignty is less likely
to require extension of tribal powers over private lands than is the case when only a small amount
of reservation land is privately owned. That is, to some extent the degree to which the reservation
has been assimilated into non-Indian society will affect the legitimacy of the state's asserted power
over the tribe. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootena Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 476 (1976) (citing the
district court opinion in this case, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1314, 1315 (D. Mont. 1975)).
144. Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982).
145: Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 293 (1982). See
also Ashcroft v. United States Dep't of Interior, 679 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 1185 (1983).
146. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 314 (1982).
147. Id. at 964. The court actually based its holding on the finding that the beds of the lake
were owned by the United States in trust for the tribes; thus, tribal regulation of shoreline struc-
tures was an undisputed tribal sovereign power. In the alternative, though, the court concluded
that even if title to those beds had passed to the state, tribal power over non-Indian land was
permissible under the Montana exception.
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D. The Role of Tribal Sovereignty in Indian Regulation of Hunting
and Fishing
As a gauge for measuring the permissible limits of the tribe's authority
over its members and its territory, established principles of tribal sovereignty
are adequate to protect the tribe's interests in regulating its federally recog-
nized hunting and fishing rights. The legitimacy of any asserted tribal sover-
eign power depends upon federal recognition. Such recognition may derive
from explicit treaty language granting off- or on-reservation rights, from rea-
sonable implications of the federal purpose revealed by the creation of the
reservation itself,'48 or from general federal legislation.' 49 Whatever the
source, recognition confirms the federal government's commitment to protect
the tribe's power to regulate in a manner coextensive with its federally recog-
nized rights. Thus, tribal sovereignty extends beyond the borders of the reser-
vation to allow regulation of treaty hunting and fishing rights. Likewise,
protection of tribal sovereignty within the reservation frequently will authorize
the assertion of tribal sovereignty over non-Indian land within the reservation.
Under the Montana test, tribal control of hunting and fishing on non-Indian
land within the reservation will be upheld if necessary to protect treaty rights,
economic or political autonomy, or the general health and welfare of the tribe.
Recognition of broad tribal powers over hunting and fishing in no way
implies an unlimited tribal right to disregard important state and federal inter-
ests in the preservation of game and wildlife. Congressional legislation may
limit the tribe's sovereign powers; 150 moreover, concurrent state law may oper-
ate to the derogation of tribal sovereignty in compelling circumstances.'15
Nevertheless, confirmation of the tribe's powers over the hunting and fishing
activities of its members and on its lands reflects clear congressional encour-
agement of tribal self sufficiency and ensures that sovereign powers will be
limited only if overriding state or federal interests are established.
148. The federal government's treaties with Indian tribes recognize the tribes' rights of self-
government, and thus confer federal protection on the tribe's sovereign powers. Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 540 (1832).
149. To the extent that congressional policy confirms tribal self-governance, that too is a
source of federal recognition and confirmation of tribal sovereignty. In fact, current federal stat-
utes encourage tribal self-sufficiency and independence, see infra notes 256-63, and thus further
confirm the legitimacy of retained, undivested tribal sovereignty.
150. Although federal power to regulate any aspect of Indian affairs is undisputed, a court will
require a clear expression of congressional intent to apply a particular statute to areas otherwise
within the retained sovereign power of the tribe. United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir.
1979). See also United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974) (Bald Eagle Protection Act,
16 U.S.C. § 668 (1982) inapplicable to treaty-protected hunting activities of tribal Indians on res-
ervations); contra United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.) (finding sufficient congres-
sional intent to abrogate treaty rights), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980).
151. The analysis proposed in this Article suggests that a presumption of preemption arises
whenever the state seeks to regulate in any area otherwise within the scope of federally recognized
tribal sovereignty. See infra text accompanying notes 253-78.
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III. STATE REGULATION OF HUNTING AND FISHING
A. State Regulation of Indian Off-Reservation Hunting and l shing
Unless federal law provides otherwise, Indian off-reservation activity gen-
erally is subject to nondiscriminatory state laws.15 2 Treaty guarantees of off-
reservation hunting and fishing rights, however, are contained in federal laws
promising protection against state interference. Thus, any state attempt to reg-
ulate Indian exercise of treaty rights will receive careful judicial scrutiny. In
the long series of cases commencing with Puyallup Tribe v. Department of
Game 153 (Puyallup I), the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have
attempted to fashion workable criteria with which to limit state incursions on
off-reservation federal treaty rights.
Relevant language in a number of treaties between the United States and
Indian tribes in the Pacific Northwest reserved to the tribes the right of fishing
"at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations. . . in common with all
citizens of the Territory."'154 In Puyallup I the Court first defined the bounds
of permissible state regulation of those treaty rights. Noting the nonexclusiv-
ity of the tribes' off-reservation right to fish, the Court determined that al-
though the state could not "qualify" the right, it could regulate "in the interest
of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does
not discriminate against the Indians."' 55 Since the courts below did not deter-
mine whether the challenged regulations were reasonable and necessary for
conservation purposes, the Court remanded for further proceedings.
Five years later, the case was back before the Court. In Puyallup 11156 the
Court reversed a state court decision upholding a Washington law that prohib-
ited all net fishing of steelhead trout.157 Because virtually all I[ndian fishing of
steelhead was done by net, the Court found that the ban amounted to unlawful
discrimination against the Indians' treaty right to engage in commercial fish-
152. Mescalero v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973). See also Russ v. Wilkins, 624 F.2d 914
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981); United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312,
408 (W.D. Wash.), a f'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
153. 391 U.S. 392 (1968). See Hobbs, Indian Hunting andFishing Rights 11, 37 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1251 (1969). The litigation has continued to the present; major cases in the dispute include
Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); United States v. Washington, 384 F.
Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aft'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086
(1976); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). The most recent cases
involve disputes over whether the treaty share should extend to hatchery fish, United States v.
Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), mod/ed, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir.), withdrawn
for rehearing en banc, 704 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983), and whether nontreaty fishermen have a right
to 50% of fish that never leave the reservation, United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 188 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
154. E.g., Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, United States-Nisqually Tribe, 10 Stat.
1132, 1133. For a complete list of the treaties reserving similar off-reservation fishing rights, see
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 349 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
155. Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. at 398. For criticism and analysis of Puyallup I, see Johnson, supra
note 2, at 207.
156. Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
157. The state allowed only sports hook and line fishing of steelhead trout because the sports
catch alone was so large that it left no more than an adequate escapement numnber for preservation
of the species. Id. at 46.
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ing. The Court emphasized, however, that the state retained its power to regu-
late when necessary for conservation;158 the ban on net fishing was invalid
because it had failed to apportion fairly the available fish between treaty and
nontreaty fishermen. Thus, the regulations were struck down, not because
they furthered an impermissible goal, but because they rendered the tribal
treaty rights meaningless. Once again the case was remanded to state court.
In the interim, however, the United States on its own behalf and as trustee
for various Indian tribes had filed suit in federal district court seeking judicial
delineation of the tribes' off-reservation fishing rights. In United States v.
Washington 159 the district court both defined the tribes' treaty right and ap-
plied the Puyallup guidelines to determine the extent of permissible state regu-
lation of the exercise of that right. Relying on the Puyallup rulings that the
tribes were entitled to an apportioned share of the fish, the district court deter-
mined that the right to fish "in common with" other citizens entitled the treaty
fishermen to take up to fifty percent of the harvestable fish.160 The court then
had to consider the permissible extent of state regulation of the exercise of
treaty rights. Again applying Puyallup standards, the court concluded that any
regulation of treaty fishing must be "reasonable and necessary to prevent de-
monstrable harm to actual conservation of fish."161 Because the state had not
sustained its burden of proving the necessity of applying numerous fishing
regulations to treaty fishermen,' 62 and because the existing state hunting and
fishing code clearly prevented the tribes from exercising their treaty rights, the
court invalidated those regulations and ordered the relevant state agencies to
"make significant reductions in the non-Indian fishery" to provide a meaning-
ful opportunity for the exercise of treaty rights. 163
Notwithstanding the district court's opinion, subsequent state court pro-
ceedings soon enjoined the state from enforcing the new regulations it had
issued in accordance with the district court order.16 Another round of deci-
158. The Court concluded: "The police power of the State is adequate to prevent the steelhead
from following the fate of the passenger pigeon; and the Treaty does not give the Indians a federal
right to pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets." Id. at 49.
159. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1086 (1976).
160. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 343. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
161. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 342.
162. The district court suggested that the state would be unable to sustain this burden:
With a single possible exception testified to by a highly interested witness... and not
otherwise substantiated, notwithstanding three years of exhaustive trial preparation,
neither Game nor Fisheries has discovered and produced any credible evidence showing
any instance, remote or recent, when a definitely identified member of any plaintiff tribe
exercised his off-reservation treaty rights by any conduct or means detrimental to the
perpetuation of any species of anadromous fish.
Id. at 338 n.26.
163. Id. at 420. Because most of the non-Indian fishing takes place at river sites before the fish
reach the upriver treaty fishing sites, regulation of non-Indian fishing was necessary to give the
treaty fishermen an opportunity to exercise treaty rights. See Comment, State Power and the In.
dian Treaty Right to Fish, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 485, 501-03 (1971).
164. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wash. 2d
276, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977); Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wash. 2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151
(1977).
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sions in federal district court and the Ninth Circuit, in which the state's at-
tempts to circumvent the federal court orders were soundly condemned, finally
reached the Supreme Court. 65 Consolidating review to consider both the
state court injunctions and the federal court opinions, the Supreme Court in
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Associa-
tion 166 (Fishing Vessel) approved the criteria used by the lower federal courts
to evaluate state regulation of treaty fishing rights. The Court reaffirmed its
earlier statements in the Puyallup series that state regulation must be limited to
strict conservation needs: "Although nontreaty fishermen might be subjected
to any reasonable state fishing regulation serving any legitimate purpose,
treaty fishermen are immune from all regulations save that required for
conservation." 167
Although the exercise of treaty fishing rights in the Northwest seems des-
tined to further prolonged litigation and federal involvement at all levels,168
the cases to date establish rules and principles applicable to any case involving
state attempts to regulate off-reservation treaty rights. The analysis involves
two steps: initially, the court must define the treaty right; second, the court
must ensure that state regulation is carefully tailored to fit within the narrow
limits of permissible state incursion. 169 The Supreme Court has concluded
that the state may regulate in the interest of conservation, provided that the
regulation meets two standards: it must be a "reasonable and necessary con-
servation measure," and its application to the Indians must be "necessary in
165. United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash.), a f'd, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th
Cir. 1978), afdsub non. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, mod#Fed, 444 U.S. 816 (1979). The Ninth Circuit began its opinion by criti-
cizing the state's reluctance to obey the district court's orders:
The State's extraordinary machinations in resisting the decree have forced the district
court to take over a large share of the management of the state's fishery in order to
enforce its decrees. Except for some desegregation cases, the district court has faced the
most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a decree of a federal court wit-
nessed in this century. The challenged orders in this appeal must be reviewed by this
court in the context of events forced by litigants who offered the court no reasonable
choice.
573 F.2d at 1126. State recalcitrance to provide ample protection of treaty rights has been noted in
the literature. See, e.g., Hobbs, supra note 153, at 1273.
166. 443 U.S. 658, modofted, 444 U.S. 816 (1979).
167. Id. at 682.
168. The federal court's role as fishmaster should be reduced somewhat by its establishment of
the Fisheries Advisory Board. See United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash.
1978). The Salmon and Steelhead Conservation and Enhancement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
561, 94 Stat. 3275 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 16, & 40 U.S.C.), was enacted in part
to minimize the hardships suffered by nontreaty fishermen by reducing their fishing to protect
treaty fishermen. Substantial amounts of federal money have implemented a buy back program
in which nontreaty fishermen can sell their equipment to the states at an attractive price. See
United States v. Washington, 645 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1981).
169. As a practical matter, the two-step analysis is necessary only if the available supply of the
resource is insufficient to allow unlimited tribal exercise of treaty rights. If the resource is plentiful
or if tribal exploitation does not threaten the resource, state regulation could never be found "nec-
essary for conservation purposes." In those instances, a determination that the treaty either ex-
pressly or impliedly reserves off-reservation hunting and fishing rights typically will free the tribal
member from state regulation. See, eg., State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759,497 P.2d 1386 (1972); State
v. Stasso, 172 Mont. 242, 563 P.2d 562 (1977).
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the interests of conservation."1 70 Lower court application of those two related
criteria has ensured meaningful protection of tribal treaty rights.
Although the state normally enjoys great latitude in regulating the man-
agement of game and wildlife, its police power is reduced significantly when
treaty rights are implicated. To fulfill the Supreme Court's first requirement
that state regulation of treaty rights be a reasonable and necessary conserva-
tion measure, the state must do more than establish that its hunting and fishing
codes are sound programs of resource allocation and management: the state
must show that its regulation is necessary to ensure the continued existence of
the resource. 171 As defined by the Sixth Circuit, the state can regulate treaty
fishing rights if that regulation is "necessary to preserve fish from extinction or
prevent irreparable damage to fish supplies or destruction of fisheries."' 72 As
a result, if a tribe can show that it adequately is regulating its members to
ensure perpetuation of the resource, state regulation will not be deemed neces-
sary.173 Moreover, under this analysis, the absence of tribal self-regulation
will not automatically justify the imposition of state law to fill any perceived
enforcement vacuum; the state still must establish that its regulations are nec-
essary to preserve the resource. In general, then, if the tribal members' actions
do not threaten the resource, the state has no power to regulate the manner in
which the tribe exercises its treaty rights, even if the tribe has chosen not to
assert its undisputed sovereignty over the exercise of its treaty rights.
The Supreme Court's second criterion, that a state's reasonable and nec-
essary conservation law will apply to treaty rights only to the extent necessary,
has been interpreted as imposing a least restrictive alternative requirement on
the regulation of treaty rights. That is, the state first must exercise its police
power over nontreaty citizens to achieve its conservation goal. If that regula-
tion will ensure preservation of the regulated resource, treaty rights must re-
main free from state interference.' 74 Taken together, the two criteria impose
stringent limits on the state's power to regulate off-reservation treaty hunting
170. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975).
171. This requirement reflects Justice Douglas' observation that "it would indeed be unusual
for a state to have the power to tax the exercise of a 'federal right.'" Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 401-
02 n.14. Thus, he continued, state regulation of a treaty right is subject to a different standard
than the constitutional standard defining the bounds of permissible state power. Id. The standard
may be similar to the "middle tier' analysis suggested in some equal protection cases. See infra
note 274.
172. United States v. Michigan, 623 F.2d 448, 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1124 (1982). Similarly, other courts have concluded that state regulation must be neces-
sary for conservation purposes, Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 908 (D. Or. 1969): or "indis-
pensable," Maison v. Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation, 314 F.2d 169, 173 (9th
Cir. 1963). See also Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. at 401-02 n.14.
173. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 340 (W.D. Wash. 1974). Adequate tribal
self-regulation would consist of, for example, a detailed code regulating the time, place, and man-
ner of the exercise of the treaty right; granting permission to the state to monitor the treaty pro-
tected activities; giving the state accurate information about the amount of the resource used; and
providing treaty fishermen with means of identification. Depletion of the resource will be pre-
vented without subjecting the tribe to state rules, thus preserving tribal sovereignty. Id. at 341.
174. United States v. Michigan, 653 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Washing-
ton, 384 F. Supp. 312, 409 (W.D. Wash. 1974); Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 907 (D. Or.
1969); People v. LeBlanc, 399 Mich. 31, 63, 248 N.W.2d 199, 214-215 (1976).
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and fishing rights. First, the validity of the police power is measured by a
stringent standard when the target of the police power is a treaty right. In
addition, the regulation can limit treaty hunting and fishing only after the state
has unsuccessfully sought to reach its conservation goal by regulating non-
treaty citizens.
The principles just described allow meaningful state regulation of feder-
ally protected tribal rights to conserve a valuable resource. On that basis, the
Supreme Court of Washington properly upheld state prosecution and convic-
tion of a treaty fisherman who had violated the state's temporary, emergency
ban on coho salmon fishing. Because the regulation had been adopted accord-
ing to proper procedures, and because the state had met its burden of estab-
lishing that the temporary ban was necessary to ensure reproduction of the
species in future years, regulation of treaty rights was permissible.175
In some instances, state regulation of off-reservation treaty rights would
appear to further legitimate police power objectives other than conservation,
such as public health and safety. For instance, state law may require the
marking of fish nets to protect the public from the safety risks posed by un-
marked nets in waters frequented by fishermen and those using the waters for
recreation. In that regard, the Supreme Court's warning that the state cannot
"qualify" the treaty right again becomes relevant: the state cannot
subordinate the tribe's rights to some other legitimate state objective or policy
without satisfying the same stringent standards imposed on its ability to regu-
late treaty rights for conservation purposes. Thus, the validity of the state po-
lice power again will require a heightened state interest. If, for example, the
state can show that unmarked fish nets pose a real safety risk, and if tribal self-
regulation has not eliminated the hazards, the relevant state regulation would
apply to tribal members to ensure that exercise of treaty rights will not endan-
ger the public safety. 17
6
B. State Regulation of Indian Hunting and Fishing on the Reservation
Prior to the Supreme Court's Puyallup decisions, the law appeared settled
that states had no power to regulate on-reservation hunting and fishing by
tribal members. State attempts to prosecute Indians hunting and fishing on
their reservation in violation of state law had failed uniformly, as the courts
175. State v. Reed, 92 Wash. 2d 271, 276, 595 P.2d 916, 919 (1979).
176. The Fishing Vessel Court appeared to allow state regulation of treaty fishing rights only
when necessary for conservation: "Although nontreaty fishermen might be subjected to any rea-
sonable state fishing regulation serving any legitimate purpose, treaty fishermen are immune from
all regulation save that required for conservation." 443 U.S. at 682. That statement is unnecessa-
rily broad. Other state regulations enacted pursuant to different police powers also should be
applicable to treaty rights if the state can meet the same heightened standards. The suggestion in
State v. Gumoe, 53 Wis. 2d 390, 410, 192 N.W.2d 892, 902 (1972), that state regulation of treaty
fishing rights is permissible if necessary in the exercise of other valid police powers, ignores the
Supreme Court's insistence that state regulation of treaty rights is subject to a higher standard
than the constitutional limits on the exercise of state police power generally. Similarly, the court
in State v. Whitebird, 110 Wis. 2d 250, 251-52, 329 N.W.2d 218, 218-19 (Ct. App. 1982), errone-
ously refused to impose that heightened standard on state attempts to regulate Indian treaty rights
in the furtherance of public safety.
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held that Indian hunting and fishing on the reservation was beyond the power
of state regulation. 177 This insulation from state regulation appeared coexten-
sive with reservation boundaries; thus, courts rejected state attempts to regu-
late tribal hunting and fishing activities on land allotted to non-Indians within
the reservation 178 and on public roads going through the reservation. 179 Actu-
ally, in more recent cases, the states frequently conceded their lack of power to
regulate Indian activity on the reservation.18 0
Two Supreme Court decisions in the trout and salmon disputes, however,
clearly had allowed state regulation to apply to on-reservation activity. In
Puyallup 111181 the Court rejected the argument that it should modify its ear-
lier holdings to exclude from state regulation Indian fishing done on land that
had been found to constitute a reservation only after the initial Puyallup deci-
sions. Reiterating its insistence that the fish be "fairly apportioned" between
treaty and nontreaty fishermen, the Court equated the tribe's asserted right to
exclusive on-reservation fishing with the power to defeat the nontreaty
fishermen's rights to a share of the resource. The Court unequivocally rejected
the tribe's claim to an exclusive right to all fish passing through its
reservation. 182
177. Moore v. United States, 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1946); In re Blackbird, 109 F. Supp. 139
(W.D. Wis. 1901); State v. Clar, 282 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. 1979); State v. Jackson, 218 Minn. 429, 16
N.W.2d 752 (1944); State v. Cloud, 179 Minn. 180, 228 N.W. 611 (1930).
178. State v. Clark, 282 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. 1979); Arnett v. 5 Gill Nets, 48 Cal. App. 3d 454,
121 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1975).
179. State v. Lemieux, 110 Wis. 2d 158, 327 N.W.2d 669 (1983); but see Lower Brule Sioux
Tribe v. South Dakota, 540 F. Supp. 276 (D.S.D. 1982), rev'don other grounds, 711 F.2d 809 (8th
Cir. 1983), in which the court found that state hunting and fishing laws were applicable to Indians
on land within the reservation borders that had been condemned by Congress for construction of
a dam.
180. E.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981); Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation v. Washington, 591 F.2d 89, 92 (9th Cir. 1979); Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 588 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. ds-
missed, 446 U.S. 960 (1979).
181. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 173-177 (1977). At the outset,
the Puyallup I Court expressly refused to consider whether the reservation had been extinguished.
391 U.S. at 394 n.l. After Puyallup II, 414 U.S. 44, the Ninth Circuit held that the reservation still
existed. United States v. Washington, 496 F.2d 620 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1974).
Thus, some of the "usual and accustomed" fishing grounds and stations now were located within
reservation borders. In Puyallup 111, 433 U.S. at 173 n.1 I, the Court again refused to rule on the
continued existence of the Puyallup reservation.
182. Puyallup 111, 433 U.S. at 173-77. In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
criticized the majority for denigrating the Court of Appeals' holding that the reservation contin-
ued to exist. Id. at 179-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissenters argued that be-
cause the treaties' "in common with" language expressly applied only to off-reservation fishing, it
was inappropriate to allow state regulation of on-reservation fishing, which was governed by Arti-
cle II of the treaty. Because Article II of the treaty provided that the reservation was to be "set
apart ... for their exclusive use" and that no white man would be permitted on the reservation
without the tribe's approval, Justice Brennan concluded that the treaty clearly had reserved exclu-
sive on-reservation fishing rights. Justice Brennan concluded the majority holding was based only
on the Court's desire to bring this case to an end, suggesting that "the result would not be the same
were the case here for the first time instead of the third." Id. at 185 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
Court appears to have adopted the Ninth Circuit's finding that the reservation exists. New Mexico
v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378, 2385 n.15 (1983).
Although the on-reservation right to fish may well be exclusive, in the sense that the tribe
may refuse to grant access to nonmembers, exclusivity does not encompass the right to destroy the
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The Fishing Vessel Court repeated that principle two years later when it
modified parts of the district court's holding that had excluded from calcula-
tion of the treaty share fish caught on the reservation, as well as fish caught for
ceremonial and subsistence purposes. The Court found that the place where
fish are taken was irrelevant to the apportionment of fish between treaty and
nontreaty fishermen; it concluded that the tribes' total catch would be used to
measure its share. 183 Some commentators and lower federal courts have criti-
cized the Court's holdings that subject on-reservation activities to state regula-
tion. They have suggested limiting the holdings to their peculiar facts and
have urged against construing the decisions to allow state regulation of tribal
hunting and fishing on the reservation. 1 4
On a theoretical level, though, it is not immediately apparent that treaty
rights exercised on the reservation are any more or any less immune from state
regulation than off-reservation treaty rights. Both derive, either expressly or
by implication, from federal laws; both reflect congressional intent to guaran-
tee to tribal members rights not held by other citizens; and both guarantee
federal protection to the holder. The locus of the exercise should not be dis-
positive; rather, when confronted with a state attempt to regulate any treaty-
protected right, whether exercised off or on the reservation, the court's analysis
should evaluate the importance of the state interest to be furthered and
whether state regulation is necessary to the protection of that interest. Both
on-reservation and off-reservation rights, and the federal protection they be-
stow on the holder, should admit the same narrow exceptions to the general
rule that treaty rights are not subject to state regulation.'85
C. State Regulation of Non-Indian Hunting and Fishing
1. Off the Reservation
State regulation of hunting and fishing generally promotes a valid police
power objective. Although the state has no ownership interest in the fish and
game within its borders, the Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized legiti-
mate state interests in the conservation and protection of wildlife.186 More-
resource. Thus, the Puyallup III Court's conclusion that state regulation applied with equal force
to all treaty rights was consistent with its earlier insistence that "the Treaty does not give the
Indians a federal right to pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets." Puyallup II,
414 U.S. at 49.
183. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 687-88 (1979).
184. E.g., United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 265-70 (W.D. Mich. 1979); United
States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 336-339 (W.D. Wash. 1974); Johnson, supra note 155;
Comment, Empty Victories: Indian Treaty Fishing Rights in the Pac Fc Northwest, 10 ENVTL. L.
REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 437 (1980). State regulation of other on-reservation activity, however, has
been upheld with a much lesser showing of necessity than that required by Puyallup and Fishing
Vessel. See infra text accompanying notes 192-232. To incorporate the Court's strict standards
into judicial evaluation of other areas in which tribal sovereign rights are implicated would seem
to offer increased, rather than diminished, protection of treaty rights.
185. See infra text accompanying notes 253-78.
186. "Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or
hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced to possession by skillful capture." Doug-
las v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977). See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
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over, the Court has recognized that states have great latitude in determining
appropriate regulations.1 87 Thus, a state may specify the time, manner, and
extent of hunting and fishing, adopt licensing programs, and impose criminal
penalties on violators of its codes. Because many species of game and wildlife
are migratory, a state also may deem it advantageous to enter into interstate
agreements for joint regulation of commercial and sport hunting and fishing
activities of particular species or in a particular area.188
Although the Supreme Court upheld a state hunting code that favored
state residents and made hunting by nonresidents more expensive and more
difficult, 189 the state does not have the same broad discretionary powers when
Indian hunting and fishing rights are affected. The state's affirmative duty to
guarantee full exercise of treaty rights' 90 may require modification of non-
Indian hunting and fishing activities. For example, a state cannot allow non-
Indian hunting and fishing to deplete the supply available to treaty fishermen.
Indirectly, then, the states' broad powers to regulate non-Indian hunting and
fishing are limited by its obligation to protect treaty rights. State regulation
that allows non-Indian hunting and fishing to derogate treaty guarantees by
making exercise of hunting and fishing rights impossible, though otherwise
unobjectionable, constitutes an invalid infringement on a federal right. 191
2. On the Reservation
The "hybrid mixture of Indian jurisdictional and proprietary interests"1 92
embodied in Indian hunting and fishing rights frequently conflicts with similar
state sovereignty interests. Those conflicts are perhaps the sharpest when the
dispute involves state regulation of non-Indian activities on the reservation.
On the one hand, the state asserts its interests as a sovereign to control and
conserve wildlife resources within its borders; in addition, it claims that its
power to regulate the conduct of non-Indians in no way infringes on tribal
sovereignty. The tribe, on the other hand, can assert the same conservation
interest in resources within its territory. Moreover, the tribe contends that, in
the absence of federal enactment to the contrary, sovereignty over tribal terri-
334-35 (1979); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 386 (1978); LaCoste v. Depart-
ment of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 549, 552 (1924).
187. See LaCoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 552 (1924).
188. See, e.g., the interstate compact among Idaho, Oregon, and Washington discussed in
Idaho ex rel Evans v. Oregon, 103 S. Ct. 2817 (1983).
189. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978). In Baldwin nonresident elk
license fees cost between 7 times and 25 times the amount paid by residents. Moreover, it ap-
pears that the state's special interest in wildlife protection justifies a total ban on nonresident
hunting or fishing. See State v. Kemp, 73 S.D. 458, 44 N.W.2d 214 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340
U.S. 923 (1951) (lack of substantial federal question).
190. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 684-85 (1979); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975).
191. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 411 (W.D. Wash. 1974). See also United
States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374, 1380-82 (9th Cir. 1982); Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899,
911 (D. Or. 1969).
192. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1145 (D. Utah 1981).
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tory vests exclusive regulatory powers over Indians and non-Indians alike in
their on-reservation activities.
Early cases challenging the applicability of state hunting and fishing laws
to non-Indians on the reservation arose in the context of a criminal prosecu-
tion of a nonmember for violating state laws on the reservation. In United
States v. Sanford 193 and State v. Danielson 194 the courts upheld the applicabil-
ity of state law against the contention that the defendants' on-reservation ac-
tivities were beyond the jurisdiction of the state. Both courts based their
holdings on findings that federal law had not preempted state law and that
application of state law would not infringe on tribal sovereignty.1 95 Although
these cases involved criminal prosecutions of non-Indians, and although the
tribal interest in self-government was asserted only by the non-Indian seeking
to avoid state prosecution, subsequent court opinions relied on these cases to
uphold the applicability of state law to on-reservation activity by non-Indians,
notwithstanding the tribe's assertion of infringement on its sovereign
powers. 196
A number of tribes have adopted increasingly sophisticated game man-
agement plans in efforts to attract non-Indian sportsmen to the reservation;
these revenue raising efforts are in part the product of congressional encour-
agement of tribal self-sufficiency and independence. As the tribes promul-
gated detailed codes purporting to regulate the on-reservation activities of
nonmembers and sometimes asserting the inapplicability of state conservation
codes, tribal-state litigation was inevitable. Applying the Supreme Court's fre-
quently repeated two-pronged test that state laws will not apply to on-reserva-
tion activity if they are preempted by federal law or if they infringe on the
tribe's right of self-government, 197 several federal circuit panels upheld the
jurisdiction of the state to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on the
reservation.
193. 547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1976). The federal prosecution in Sanford was brought under the
Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1982), which prohibits the interstate transportation of wildlife killed in
violation of state laws. Thus, the court first had to determine whether state laws applied to the
reservation before it could find the basis of a Lacey Act offense. The court held state law applica-
ble, Sanford, 547 F.2d at 1089. The Act was recently amended to provide that violation of a tribal
hunting and fishing ordinance could subject the violator to a Lacey Act prosecution. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3371-3378 (1982).
194. 427 P.2d 689 (Mont. 1967).
195. The courts found that a federal statute punishing on-reservation hunting and fishing un-
authorized by the tribe did not show congressional intent to occupy the field of fish and game
management. Danielson, 427 P.2d at 692; Sanford, 547 F.2d at 1089. In addition, both courts
rather summarily concluded that application of state law would not interfere with tribal self-
governance. Danielson, 427 P.2d at 693; Sanford, 547 F.2d at 1089. Since the respective tribes
were not in any way involved in the case, it is not surprising that the courts found that tribal
sovereign interests were not affected.
196. E.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274, 1285 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Washington, 604 F.2d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'don othergrounds, 450 U.S.
544 (1981).
197. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378, 2386 n.16 (1983); Ramah Nav-
ajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 102 S. Ct. 3394, 3398 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 158 (1980); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976).
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Any preemption analysis of tribal-state disputes over the ability to regu-
late on-reservation activity must start with the Supreme Court's decision in
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,198 in which the Court found tradi-
tional preemption analysis199 inapplicable to Indian affairs. Noting firm fed-
eral encouragement of tribal independence and repeating that ambiguities in
federal law must be construed generously in favor of the Indians, the Court
rejected the idea that preemption of state law required express congressional
intent. Rather, the Court stated, the preemption analysis involves "a particu-
larized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal and tribal interests at stake,
an inquiry designed to determine whether in the specific context, the exercise
of state authority would violate federal law.''2°° In White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Arizona201 the Ninth Circuit applied the Bracker analysis and con-
cluded that the state could impose its hunting and fishing laws on non-Indians
on the reservation if the state could show a substantial conservation interest.
The White Mountain court analyzed Bracker and found three possible bases
for concluding that state law was preempted: comprehensive federal regula-
tion, federal policy favoring self-management, and lack of legitimate state in-
terest in regulating the on-reservation activity. The court found none of these
factors present in the case before it.202
According to the White Mountain court, federal statutes relating to hunt-
ing and fishing, and general federal statutes encouraging tribal self-determina-
tion, did not constitute comprehensive federal regulation that would preclude
the application of state law.203 The court next examined federal policies en-
198. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
199. In other areas of the law, the courts are more hesitant to find that state law has been
preempted: "'It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise
of the power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise of
federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed."' New York Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino,
413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)).
200. Aracker, 448 U.S. at 145. In Bracker the Court struck down Arizona's attempt to impose
a motor vehicle license and use fuel taxes on on-reservation logging operations conducted by a
non-Indian corporation pursuant to a contract with the tribe.
201. 649 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter referred to as White Mountain].
202. Id. at 1278-84.
203. Id. at 1279. The Court noted that Congress had consistently preserved state fish and
game regulations in areas under potentially exclusive control and cited statutory provisions con-
cerning national forests (16 U.S.C. § 528 (1982)), National Wildlife Refuge Systems (16 U.S.C.
§§ 670h(b), 670h(C)(4), 670i(b)(4), 670k(6) (1982)). In addition, it concluded that the federal tres-
pass statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982), did not reflect congressional intent to enter the arena of fish
and game regulations. Id.
As a matter of fact, however, rather than "preserve" state law, the statutory provision for
National Wildlife Refuge Systems provides that regulations shall be consistent with state laws to
the extent possible. 16 U.S.C. § 670 (1982). Moreover, the public lands sections expressly state
that the Act has no effect on Indian hunting and fishing rights. 16 U.S.C § 670m (1982). Al-
though the court referred to these statutes as showing lack of congressional intent to preempt, they
seem to illustrate just the contrary: Congress made state hunting and fishing laws applicable on
federal lands when it saw fit; its failure to extend the grant to Indian reservations, coupled with its
express disclaimer in § 670m, indicates that Congress assumes that states lack power to apply their
laws to the reservation.
Moreover, with regard to the federal trespass statute, the Supreme Court has recently found
§ 1165 to be a basis for imposing criminal penalties on violators of tribal hunting and fishing
codes. Mescalero, 103 S. Ct. at 2391 n.27.
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couraging tribal self-determination as reflected in treaties, statutes and admin-
istrative practice. Finding that the only tribal self-government interest at stake
was a potential loss of revenues, the court concluded the tribal sovereignty
interest was not "overly weighty.' '2°4 Turning to the third relevant factor in
Bracker, the court in White Mountain found an important state interest in
regulating hunting and fishing for the purpose of conservation and fish man-
agement.205 On that basis, the court concluded that state law was not pre-
empted. Other courts, though engaging in less detailed preemption analyses,
likewise concluded that state hunting and fishing codes, as applied to non-
Indians on the reservation, were not preempted by federal law.2°6
Concluding that state law was not preempted, however, does not end the
inquiry. In a long line of cases beginning with Williams v. Lee,207 the
Supreme Court has repeated that a state law will not apply to on-reservation
activity if it would infringe on tribal sovereignty. While recognizing that the
preemption analysis is the most frequent basis of decision, the Court continues
to characterize the infringement test as an independent bar to state law. Thus,
when evaluating state attempts to apply hunting and fishing codes to non-
Indians on the reservation, lower courts have evaluated the potential impact
on tribal sovereignty. By defining the right of tribal self-government as ex-
tending "only to intratribal relations and to concurrent civil authority over
visitors to reservations," 208 the White Mountain court could have concluded
that no tribal sovereignty interest was implicated by the application of state
hunting and fishing laws to non-Indians. Other courts, less willing to define
tribal sovereignty in such a narrow way, agreed that state law would infringe
on tribal sovereignty, but nevertheless concluded that the infringement was
permissible. Thus, in White Earth Band of Chipewa Indians v. Alexander20 9 a
federal district court found that because many non-Indians are likely to buy
tribal permits to protect themselves from inadvertently hunting and fishing on
tribal lands without a permit, and because many non-Indians who hunt and
fish on Indian land already have a state license, no tribal economic interests
were threatened by requiring non-Indians hunting on the reservation to
204. White Mountain, 649 F.2d at 1283.
205. Id.
206. Because Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 591 F.2d
89 (9th Cir. 1979), and United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part, 450
U.S. 544 (1981), were decided before Bracker, their traditional preemption analyses are not based
on correct principles of Indian law. The Supreme Court's Montana decision, however, left un-
touched that part of the Ninth Circuit's holding that state law applied to non-Indian activity on
land within the reservation owned by non-Indians. The Eighth Circuit in White Earth Band of
Chippewa Indians v. Alexander, 683 F.2d 1130 (8th Cir. 1982), upheld the applicability of state
law despite the district court's failure to follow a careful weighing of interests as required by
Bracker. The court found remand unnecessary because the tribe had not shown that the state's
hunting and fishing laws were beyond the scope of its police power. The court incorrectly equated
legitimacy of police power with the state's ability to regulate treaty rights. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 170-73.
207. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
208. White Mountain, 649 F.2d at 1284.
209. 518 F. Supp. 527, 537 (D. Minn. 1981), aft'd, 683 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 489 (1983).
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purchase a state license. The court did not discuss whether application of state
law would derogate the tribe's traditionally respected sovereignty over its
territory.2 10
Central to every holding that state law was applicable to non-Indian
hunting and fishing on the reservation was judicial recognition that state regu-
lation of hunting and fishing effectuates an important state interest in conser-
vation and wildlife management.2 11 If, however, the tribes have a federally
protected right to condition and even prohibit the hunting and fishing activi-
ties of non-Indians on the reservation, as the state in each case conceded, 2 12
the analysis should depend not on whether the state law advances a legitimate
police power objective, but on whether state regulation of a federally protected
right is permissible. As Justice Douglas noted in Puyallup I, the tests are dif-
ferent: "The measure of the legal propriety of. . .conservation measures
[regulating federally protected treaty rights] is therefore distinct from the fed-
eral constitutional standard concerning the scope of the police power of a
State. '2 13 The point is an important one: the validity of the police power
asserted should be a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite to finding state
law applicable to non-Indians on the reservation, just as in disputes over state
regulation of Indian off-reservation rights. Both types of disputes involve state
attempts to regulate a right guaranteed by treaty, and both should be subject
to the same analysis. Federal recognition of the tribe's right to control its terri-
tory to the extent of excluding nonmembers raises barriers to the operation of
state law that should be relaxed only upon a showing, in the Puyallup Court's
210. The Ninth Circuit in Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washing-
ton, 591 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1979), made no reference to tribal sovereignty as an independent bar to
state law, basing its holding that state law applied to non-Indian hunting and fishing on the reser-
vation solely on its conclusion that state law had not been preempted. Subsequently, in United
States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd in parl, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), the Ninth
Circuit concluded that tribal sovereignty would not be infringed as long as Montana did not apply
its regulations to Indian hunting and fishing and provided its regulation of non-Indians on the
reservation did not discriminate against the tribe. Id. at 1172.
In a rare case finding state law inapplicable to the on-reservation fishing activities of non-
members, the Fourth Circuit, in Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife
Resources Comm'n, 588 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978), found state law preempted and also concluded
that imposition of state law would frustrate tribal sovereignty. In Eastern Band the tribe had
developed an extensive program to attract non-Indian trout fishermen to the reservation. With
federal funds and personnel assistance, the tribe's streams were stocked with fish raised by the
Department of the Interior. The state sought to impose its license fee on non-Indians fishing on
the reservation; the court, on the basis of strong congressional support of the fishing program,
found federal intent to prempt state law. Moreover, the court noted, the state could assert no
legitimate regulatory interest in nonmigratory wildlife resources developed solely with federal
funds and assistance. While basing its holding on preemption grounds, the court also found that
the state law would frustrate "one major goal of tribal self-government, financial self-sufficiency."
Id. at 78.
211. United States v. Montana, 686 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1982); White Earth Band of Chip-
pewa Indians v. Alexander, 683 F.2d 1129, 1137 (8th Cir. 1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274, 1283 (9th Cir. 1981).
212. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981); Confed-
erated Tribe of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 591 F.2d 89, 92 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd in part, 450 U.S. 544 (1981);
White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians v. Alexander, 518 F. Supp. 527, 534-35 (D. Minn. 1981),
aj'd, 683 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1982).
213. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 401 n.14 (1968).
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words, that application of the law is "necessary" to protect a heightened state
interest.214
The Supreme Court's decision in Montana v. United States215 seemed to
leave the Court's imprimatur on lower court holdings that state law is gener-
ally applicable to the on-reservation hunting and fishing activity of non-Indi-
ans. While reversing the Ninth Circuit's opinion that the tribe could exercise
concurrent jurisdiction with the state over non-Indian activities on fee lands
within the borders of the reservation, the Montana Court left intact that part of
the opinion finding Montana law applicable to all non-Indian hunting and
fishing on any land within the borders of the reservation. In New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe,?16 however, the Supreme Court unanimously con-
cluded that federal law had preempted New Mexico's hunting and fishing laws
to the extent it was purported to apply to the reservation.
The Mescalero Apache Tribe, working closely with the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, and the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, undertook substantial development of the reservation's hunting and fish-
ing resources. In an effort to generate tribal revenues, to provide employment
to tribal members, and generally to further tribal self-sufficiency, the develop-
ment program included construction of a resort complex, creation of eight arti-
ficial lakes stocked by an on-reservation fish hatchery, and adoption of a range
management program designed to increase the elk, antelope, bear, and deer
herds on the reservation. Management of the wildlife resources rests with the
tribal council, which, pursuant to its constitution217 and an agreement with the
federal government, enacts ordinances every year to regulate all on-reserva-
tion hunting and fishing activities. The ordinances, which are subject to fed-
eral approval, reflect the recommendations and yearly projections of wildlife
supply of the reservation's range conservation staff and impose licensing and
time, place, and manner restrictions on hunting and fishing.218
In 1969 the tribe asserted the right to exclude state game and fish officers
without tribal authorization. The state honored the tribe's request, but contin-
ued to arrest nonmembers of the tribe for illegal possession of game and fish as
they left the reservation. 219 Because of numerous conflicts between tribal or-
dinances and state hunting and fishing laws, the tribe filed suit in 1977 to pre-
vent state regulation of on-reservation hunting and fishing activities. The
214. id.
215. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
216. 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983).
217. The tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 461
(1982) which authorizes all reservation tribes to enact a constitution and bylaws, subject to ap-
proval by the Secretary of the Interior.
218. The state conceded that tribal management of the reservation wildlife had been "exem-
plary and in conformance with accepted wildlife management procedures." Mescalero, 630 F.2d
724, 726 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). The state also recognized it
could show no conservation need to regulate the reservation wildlife but argued that wildlife man-
agement efficiency concerns required application of state law. Id.
219. Id. at 729 n.10; Mescalero, 103 S. Ct. at 2383.
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district court ruled in favor of the tribe, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.220
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision for reconsideration
after its decision in Montana v. United States.221 On remand, the Tenth Cir-
cuit reiterated its earlier decision,222 and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Repeating its earlier formulation of the preemption analysis applicable to
Indian affairs, the Court stated that "state jurisdiction is preempted by the
operation of federal law if it interferes with or is incompatible with federal and
tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are
sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority. '223 The Court also articu-
lated several guidelines for assessing the relevant "federal and tribal interests."
First, traditional notions of tribal sovereignty provide a "crucial backdrop;" 224
moreover, general federal Indian legislation reflects staunch federal commit-
ment to tribal self-government.225 In addition, the Court emphasized its fre-
quent reaffirmation of tribal power "to manage the use of its territory and its
resources by both members and non-members. '2 26 And finally, the Court
noted, the correct preemption analysis recognizes and evaluates the impor-
tance of the state's asserted regulatory interest.
Applying those principles to the case before it, the Court found strong
federal and tribal interests in favor of preemption. As an initial matter the
Court noted the tribe's undisputed control over its lands and resources, as evi-
denced by the treaty between the tribe and the United States and by federal
statutes confirming this power.227 The Court then considered the impact of
220. 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980).
221. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
222. 677 F.2d 55 (1982).
223. Mescalero, 103 S. Ct. at 2386. This language comes close to establishing a presumption
against the applicability of state law. See infra text accompanying notes 252-77.
224. Mescalero, 103 S. Ct. at 2378. In Bracker the Court had stated that tribal sovereignty
formed an "important" backdrop. 448 U.S. at 143. In turn, the Bracker Court strengthened its
earlier declaration that tribal sovereignty "provides a backdrop against which the applicable trea-
ties and federal statutes must be read." McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172
(1973).
225. E.g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1982); Indian Self-Determination
and Educational Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1982); Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1982); Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982); see also
Mescalero, 103 S. Ct. at 2386 n.17.
226. Mescalero, 103 S. Ct. at 2387.
227. E.g., Treaty with the Apaches, July 1, 1852, United States-Apache Tribe, 10 Stat. 890.
The court of appeals found and the Supreme Court agreed that the treaty contained an implied
reservation of tribal sovereignty over the resources within the tribe's resources. 630 F.2d at 728-
29, 731; 103 S. Ct. at 2387-88. Moreover, in addition to general federal statutes encouraging tribal
self-sufficiency, the Court discussed various federal statutes confirming the right of tribal sover-
eignty over hunting and fishing resources. Public Law 280, under which the states may assume
criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribes, specifically reserves the tribes's power to regulate hunt-
ing and fishing on the reservation. 25 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1982).
Because Indian hunting and fishing rights are specifically excluded, the difficult jurisdictional
questions created when states assume Public Law 280 jurisdiction over Indian reservations are
beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976);
Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 535 (1975).
A federal criminal trespass law, 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982), and the Lacey Act Amendments of
1981, 16 U.S.C. § 3371 (1982), provide for federal prosecution of hunting and fishing in violation
of Indian tribal law. Also, the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982), generally con-
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state regulatory powers on these reservation activities and concluded it would
"disturb and disarrange" a comprehensive federal scheme and threaten Con-
gress' overriding goal of encouraging tribal self-governance. 223 Finally, in its
evaluation of the state's regulatory interest, the Court found no state contribu-
tion to these on-reservation activities, and no off-reservation effects that other-
wise might justify the assertion of state power. Because the balancing of
interests revealed no significant state interest 229 in the face of substantial fed-
eral and tribal interests, the court concluded that state law could not apply to
any on-reservation hunting and fishing activities.230
Taken in conjunction, the Court's opinions inMontana v. United States231
and Mescalero articulated several important, if not entirely consistent, princi-
ples applicable to disputes over state regulation of on-reservation activities.
First, Montana suggests that state law generally applies to non-Indian fee land
within the reservation, unless the tribe can show that state regulation would
have a substantial, adverse effect on tribal survival. Tribal sovereignty, in light
of Montana, is not necessarily co-extensive with the reservation borders. Any
assertion of tribal authority over non-Indian lands requires a showing that
serious tribal concerns are implicated. Mescalero, however, greatly limits the
state's ability to regulate on-reservation activities (presumably only on those
reservations where non-Indian ownership is minimal)232 to those cases in
which the state can show a substantial need or interest in regulating. The
analysis to be applied, then, hinges on the amount of non-Indian ownership
within the borders of the reservation.
D. Enforcement of Permissible State Regulation
A court determination that a state can regulate a particular aspect of In-
dian hunting and fishing does not necessarily resolve the dispute. Difficult en-
firms "all powers vested in any Indian tribe... by existing law." Mescalero, 103 S. Ct. at 2388
nn.20 & 21. Thus, the Mescalero Court found that tribal sovereignty over on-reservation wildlife
resources was a federally protected right.
228. 103 S. Ct. at 2388 (citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S.
685, 691 (1965)).
229. The only state interests asserted were the state's interest in promoting efficiency in wild-
life management, 630 F.2d at 726, and the state's loss of revenues from the sale of state licenses
plus some federal matching funds calculated with reference to the total number of state licenses
sold. 103 S. Ct. at 2391 n.28. The state interest was further diminished because the state played
no role in the development of the resources it sought to regulate; moreover, the wildlife that the
state sought to regulate was nonmigratory. In these respects the Puyallup litigation is significantly
different. There, the trout and salmon displayed intricate migratory patterns frequently passing
through treaty fishing sites on their way to and from the ocean. Moreover, state funds played a
substantial role in increasing these fish populations. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d at
1380.
230. Applying the Mescalero rationale, the district court ruled that Arizona's hunting and fish-
ing regulations are inapplicable on the Fort Apache reservation. White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Arizona, 11 INDIAN L. REP. 3002 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 1983).
231. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 127-47.
232. InMescalero only 193 acres on the 460,000 acre reservation were owned by non-Indians.
103 S. Ct. at 2381. The reservations in Puyallup and Montana showed significantly larger non-
Indian ownership. Only 22 acres of the 18,000 acre Puyallup reservation were owned by Indians,
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 174 (1977); 28% of the Crow reserva-
tion involved in Montana had passed to private ownership, 450 U.S. at 548.
1984]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
forcement problems may persist, particularly if the approved regulation
applies to on-reservation activity.233 Because the tribes have retained their
sovereign power to exclude nonmembers from the reservation, a holding that
state law applies to on-reservation activities may be meaningless if state en-
forcement officials are barred from the reservation. At least one federal dis-
trict court, while holding California game laws applicable to non-Indians on
the reservation, denied state game wardens the authority to enter the reserva-
tion without tribal permission.234 Arizona state officials in a Ninth Circuit
case conceded their lack of power to enter the reservation, but contended that
state game law could be enforced as non-Indian violators left the reservation
with their illegal catch.235 The Supreme Court, in cases holding state law ap-
plicable to on-reservation activities, has failed to reach the enforcement
issue.236
It appears that state officials can arrest Indians on public roads within the
reservation. 237 In that situation, although the arrest would be valid, the suc-
cess of a prosecution would depend on whether state law applied to the partic-
ular activity. Thus, on-reservation enforcement problems arise whether the
violator is Indian or non-Indian. In many instances, state enforcement will be
effective at the entrance to the reservation. If, however, the state can demon-
strate a substantial need to enforce state law on the reservation, that authority
follows logically from a decision that state law applies on the reservation. 238
State enforcement at treaty sites off the reservation may be equally prob-
lematic. If state law is inapplicable to off-reservation sites because the tribes
are self-regulating, and the state discovers inadequate tribal enforcement of its
own regulations, the state has limited recourses. Under the United States v.
233. Law enforcement on Indian reservations may involve city, county, or state police officers,
tribal enforcement authorities, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, or the F.B.I., depending on the locus
of the act and the identity of the parties involved. Cross-deputization is a cooperative effort be-
tween state, tribal, and federal authorities that grants enforcement powers to officials who other-
wise would be limited in their abilities to arrest certain individuals or to arrest on certain lands.
The cross-deputization process has had mixed results. See Wall, 16 Am. INDIAN L. NEWSLETTER
34 (1983).
234. California v. Quechan Tribe, 424 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Cal. 1977), vacated on other grounds,
595 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1979).
235. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1981). White Moun-
lain consolidated two similar cases, one involving the Arizona White Mountain Apaches, and the
other involving the Washington Colvilles. Washington asserted the right of its officials to enter
the reservation. Id. at 1277.
236. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
154-58 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 468 n.6 (1976).
237. See State v. Lemieux, 110 Wis. 2d 158, 327 N.W.2d 669 (1983). See also State v. Fol-
strom, 331 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1983).
238. In California v. Quechan Tribe, 424 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Cal. 1977), vacated on other
grounds, 595 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1979), the court decided that the state would be granted the
power to enter the reservation to enforce applicable laws only if a compelling need were estab-
lished. Id. at 976.
Granting state authority to enter in carefully limited instances does not open the door to
widespread state interference with Indian affairs on the reservation. First, the hurdles to making
the initial finding that state law is applicable are substantial. Second, the state then would have to
establish a compelling need to enter the reservation to enforce the applicable law. Thus, a showing
that off-reservation enforcement was adequate, or a showing that tribal self-regulation ensured
enforcement of applicable state law, would preclude entry by state officials.
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Washington239 plan approved by the Supreme Court,240 state officials can
monitor compliance at the off-reservation sites. In addition, they can report
violations to the tribe and ultimately seek judicial relief if all other avenues of
encouraging adequate tribal self-regulation prove unsuccessfll.241 The Ore-
gon court of appeals, however, has held that an Indian fishing at a usual and
accustomed fishing ground in violation of both state and tribal regulations is
not immune from state prosecution.242 This holding, though facially respon-
sive to the state's legitimate interest in preserving wildlife, does not necessarily
survive the Supreme Court's decision in Fishing Vessel. Prosecution of an In-
dian exercising treaty rights requires a specific showing that application of
state law is necessary to the preservation of the resource. 243 Once a state en-
acts a necessary conservation measure, carefully tailored to minimize infringe-
ment on tribal sovereignty according to the Puyallup standards, Indian self-
regulation becomes irrelevant. An Indian violating such a state regulation is
subject to state prosecution.244
IV. EVALUATING STATE INCURSIONS ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
A. The Demise of Tribal Sovereignty as an Independent Bar to State Law
Although the Supreme Court abandoned its earlier "platonic" notions of
tribal sovereignty, 245 it continues to repeat its dictum in W"liams v. Lee2 46
that tribal sovereignty can constitute an independent bar to the application of
state law: "[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them."247 Actually, however, every Supreme
Court decision finding state law inapplicable to Indian-related activities rested
239. 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash. 1978); 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
240. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658 (1979).
241. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 408-10.
242. State v. Gowdy, 1 Or. App. 424, 462 P.2d 461 (1969).
243. Of course, it is possible that tribal regulation would be found co-extensive with the treaty
right. In that case, the Indian would not be immune from state law, not because he was violating
tribal law, but because he was not acting within his treaty rights and thus generally subject to state
law. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973).
244. See State v. Reed, 92 Wash. 2d 271, 595 P.2d 916 (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 930
(1979). A showing that the defendant was acting in adherence to tribal law would have no bearing
on his guilt or innocence. In Reed the Court upheld an Indian's conviction for net fishing coho
salmon in violation of an emergency ban on all coho salmon fishing submitted to and approved by
the district court.
245. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). See also
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S.
145, 148 (1973).
246. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
247. Id. at 220. The Supreme Court reconfirmed the vitality of the tribal sovereignty bar, or
"infringement test," in its most recent case involving state assertions of regulatory power over
reservation activities. Mescalero, 103 S. Ct. at 2386 n.16. See also Ramah Navajo School Bd. v.
Bureau of Revenue, 102 S. Ct. 3394, 3398 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136, 142 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 158 (1980); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976).
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its holding on a preemption analysis. 248 That is, the Supreme Court weighed
relevant state and federal interests, measured against the "crucial" backdrop
of tribal sovereignty and determined whether federal law leaves room for the
application of state law.249 The suggestion that tribal sovereignty cannot of its
own force preclude state regulation, despite repeated Court dicta to the con-
trary, is consistent with established principles of Indian law. Because congres-
sional control over the contours and very existence of tribal sovereign powers
is absolute,250 to refer to tribal sovereignty as a bar to state law is merely to
articulate the preemption analysis in a slightly different form. That is, state
law may be inapplicable to an Indian-related activity because Congress has
confirmed the tribe's exclusive power to regulate such activity. Delineation of
248. Some cases expressly hold state law inapplicable on preemption grounds. E.g., Ramah
Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 102 S. Ct. 3394, 3402-03 (1982); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 138 (1980); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S.
145, 158 (1973); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973); Warren
Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965).
The Court's holding in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), the source of the language
establishing the infringement test, is easily explained on a straight preemption rationale. In Wi,-
liams the Court denied the state jurisdiction over a suit brought by a non-Indian against an Indian
to collect for goods sold to the Indian on the reservation. Noting that congressional recognition of
tribal self-government was reflected in the treaty with the tribe and in the Navajo Hopi Rehabili-
tation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 631-640 (1982), the Court concluded that if this federally recognized
Indian sovereignty over the reservation is to be abrogated, "it is for Congress to do it." 358 U.S. at
223. Moreover, the Court found significance in the negative inference to be drawn from a federal
statute authorizing a state to assume civil or criminal jurisdiction over an Indian reservation:
"[W]hen Congress has wished the States to exercise this power [over the reservation] it has ex-
pressly granted them the jurisdiction which Worcester Y. State of Georgia had denied." Id. at 221.
State law was inapplicable, then, because it had been preempted by clear congressional protection
of tribal sovereignty.
Similarly, Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976), in which the Court denied the state
jurisdiction over an Indian adoption proceeding, rests on preemption grounds. Because the In-
dian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982), "specifically intended to eicourage Indian tribes
to revitalize their self-government," id. at 387, and because the tribe's right to "govern itself inde-
pendently of state law has been consistently protected by federal statute," id. at 386, the Court
concluded that the tribe's adoption ordinance "implements an overriding federal policy which is
clearly adequate to defeat state jurisdiction." Id. at 390. State jurisdiction "defeated" by an
"overriding federal policy" has been preempted.
Even Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), and its famous statement that "[tlhe
Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory. . . in which the laws
of Georgia can have no force," id at 561, based its conclusion on a finding that current congres-
sional policy admitted no state interference with tribal affairs. The Court defined that policy, as
expressed in federal statutes, as one which "manifestly consider[s] the several Indian nations as
distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclu-
sive." Id. at 557. See also id at 554, 556. State law was invalidated because it "interfer[ed]
forcibly with the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee nation." Id. at
561. Again, this is a preemption analysis.
Thus, tribal sovereignty stands as a bar to state law only to the extent that tribal sovereignty is
confirmed by Congress. The infringment theory does no more than recast the preemption analysis
in slightly different form. See also Indian Civil Rights Task Force, Development of Tripartite Juris-
diction in Indian Country, 22 U. KAN. L. Rav. 351, 380-85 (1974); Lynaugh, DevelopIng Theories of
State Jurisdiction over Indians: The Dominance of the Preemption Analysis, 38 MONT. L. REV. 63
(1977); Mettler, 4 Unied Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 89 (1978).
249. See, eg., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983). See also supra
text accompanying notes 198-200. See Clinton, State Power over Indian Reservations." 4 Critical
Comment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D.L. REv. 434 (1981), for criticism of the extent to which
the current Court has allowed state law to apply in derogation of tribal sovereignty.
250. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978); Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
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the bounds of permissible state power over Indian affairs is understood better
as a pure preemption analysis. To accurately reflect Congress' steadfast sup-
port of tribal self-development, however, courts should adopt a presumption
that state law is inapplicable to any activity, whether on or off the reservation,
if the federal government has recognized tribal sovereignty over that activ-
ity.251 A presumption of preemption would reflect not only the clear congres-
sional intent that Indian tribes achieve a maximum amount of self-
government and self-sufficiency, but also would recognize that tribal sover-
eignty depends solely on congressional confirmation. Moreover, because the
state would be able to overcome the presumption only upon a clear showing of
a well-defined need, the analysis would limit instances of state incursion on
tribal affairs while recognizing that tribes are no longer independent sover-
eigns but have assumed the peculiar role of a "dependent domestic nation."252
B. The Presumption of Preemption
1. Source of the Presumption
A presumption of preemption finds ample support in federal statutes and
in well-established rules of construction developed by the Supreme Court in a
long series of Indian cases. Treaties establishing reservations in exchange for
tribal cession of aboriginal territory (typically setting aside the land "for the
use of' or "for the exclusive use of' the particular tribe) raise barriers to state
authority.2 53 Similarly, numerous state enabling act disclaimers embody the
same determination to limit state jurisdiction over Indian affairs.254 Thus,
treaties and disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indians contained in many state
enabling acts reflect early federal intent that Indians would remain separate
from the rest of the population, with full control over their own affairs. The
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)25 5 is perhaps the first major modem con-
gressional reaffirmation of tribal self-governance and economic self-suffi-
ciency. Among the Act's stated purposes was the intent to extend to the tribes
"the fundamental rights of political liberty and local self-governance. ' 25 6 Af-
ter Congress' "brief though disastrous experiment with the termination policy
251. Thus, the preliminary inquiry would focus on whether the asserted tribal power has been
implicitly divested, see supra text accompanying notes 97-106.
252. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
253. See, e.g., Mescalero, 103 S. Ct. at 2387-88; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1959);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 575-76 (1832) (McClean J., concurring).
254. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1973); Mescalero,
630 F.2d at 731. See F. COHEN, supra note 4, at 268-69 for a discussion of the effect of enabling
act disclaimers.
255. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1982).
256. S. REP. No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d. Sess. 3-4 (1934) (letter from President Roosevelt). See
also H.R. REP. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6 (1934). Tribal ordinances enacted pursuant to
power confirmed by the IRA provide additional evidence of congressional intent to preempt. See
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156 (1980);
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976); Mescalero, 630 F.2d at 732. Although this
policy was repudiated during a brief period when Congress sought to terminate all Indian reserva-
tions, congressional policy has once again shifted to a firm commitment to tribal self-governance.
See Oversight of Economic Development on Indian Reservations, Hearing Before the Select Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1-2 (1982); F. COHEN, supra note 4, at 152-206.
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of the 1950'S,"2 57 and because the IRA had failed to provide sufficient oppor-
tunities for tribal involvement with policy and decisionmaking functions, 258
the Indian Financing Act of 1974259 and the Indian Self Determination and
Educational Assistance Act 260 established clear congressional commitment to
the enhancement of tribal self-governing power.261 In a similar vein, congres-
sional enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968262 acknowledged the
existence of tribal self-governing power under the plenary power of Congress
by establishing procedures for its exercise.263 Other congressional statutes,
covering a wide variety of areas, repeatedly reaffirmed congressional encour-
agement of the full development of tribal sovereignty.2 "
Of equal importance, perhaps, are the negative inferences to be drawn
from several statutes specifically authorizing the assertion of state power over
Indian affairs; the conferral of state power in specific instances implies that
Congress intended not to confer that power in other instances. 265 In what is
commonly referred to as Public Law 280, for example, Congress provided
means by which states could assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over reser-
257. H.R. REP. No. 1600, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 20 (1974).
258. Id.
259. 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1982).
260. Id. § 450.
261. Congressional declaration of policy in the Indian Financing Act of 1974 is stated as the
development of Indian resources "to a point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for
the utilization and management of their own resources." Id. § 1451. Legislative history similarly
emphasizes congressional intent to implement the "long sought after goal of Indian self-suffi-
ciency." H.R. REP. No. 907, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974). See also S. REP. No. 348, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1973); Indian FinancingAct of 1973, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of
the House Comm on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1974); Financing the
Economic Development of Indians and Indian Organizations, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs of the Se Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong.; 1st Sess. 1, 45, 120
(1973).
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act reflects identical conressional
concern with the erosion of tribal sovereignty and declares its intent "to promote maximum In-
dian participation in the government and education of the Indian people." H.R. REP. No. 1600,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974). See also S. Rep. No. 682, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974); Indian Self-
Determination and Education Program, Hearings Before the Subcomm on Indian Affairs of the Sen.
Comm. on Interior andInsular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1973). The statute itself recognizes
the government's obligation "to respond to the strong expression of the Indian people for self-
determination." 25 U.S.C. § 450a (1982).
262. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
263. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 551-53 (1974); S. REp. No. 762, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974).
264. For example, as Justice Brennan noted in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 167 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 91 Stat. 735 (1977) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. V 1981)), confer on tribal governing bodies the exclusive power to redesig-
nate lands for air quality purposes, and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
91 Stat. 455, 523 (1977) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1981)), voices similar concerns.
The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 97th Cong., 96
Stat. 2607 (1982) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)), which treats tribal governments as states for
purposes of obtaining favorable tax treatment, was passed to facilitate the tribal efforts to "assist
their people by stimulating tribal economies and providing governmental services." S. REP, No.
646, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1982). See also H. REP. No. 984, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1982).
265. The "express inclusion, implied exclusion" rule of statutory construction (expresslo unius
est inclusio aiterius) is well established. See 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 47.23 (1973 & 1983 Cum. Supp.).
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vations.266 Even those states that assume jurisdiction pursuant to those proce-
dures are required by statute to disclaim any power to regulate treaty hunting
and fishing rights.267 Similarly, in several conservation statutes, Congress pro-
vided for operation of state law on certain federal lands but never extended
that grant of state power to Indian reservations. 268 Congressional grants of
jurisdiction reveal congressional intent to grant the states powers otherwise
denied to them.269 Thus, these statutes provide additional evidence of con-
gressional intent to minimize assertions of state power over those areas in
which tribal sovereignty has received congressional approval.
Judicially developed rules of construction also support the adoption of a
presumption of preemption. The Supreme Court frequently has stated that
statutes and treaties are to be construed liberally to further Indian interests;270
doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the Indians.271 In addition,
a court must interpret treaty provisions to reflect what the Indians are likely to
have understood at the time they signed them.272 Both rules suggest that a
court should be slow to validate state attempts to regulate Indian affairs, at
least in the absence of a carefully articulated need. In sum, a presumption of
preemption would reflect accurately congressional commitment to tribal de-
velopment and the Supreme Court's repeated insistence that the statutes em-
bodying this clear commitment be construed liberally to protect Indian
interests in tribal sovereignty.
2. Application of the Presumption
The presumption of preemption as proposed in this Article would arise
any time a state attempts to regulate in an area otherwise left to the tribes in
266. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (1953) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.).
267. "Nothing in this section.. . shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or com-
munity of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute
with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof." 18
U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1982).
268. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1982) (national forests); Id. § 668dd(c) (National Wildlife Refuge
System; federal regulation shall be consistent with state laws to the extent possible); id. §§ 670h(b)
& (c)(4) (other public lands); id. § 670i(b)(4) (same); id. § 670k(6) (same); see also id § 670m
(expressly stipulating that no provision of the act is intended to affect Indian hunting and fishing
rights). The Ninth Circuit has found that these statutes demonstrate a lack of congressional intent
to preempt state law. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274, 1279 (9th Cir.
1981). A more compelling conclusion, however, is that by specifically granting jurisdiction in some
instances, Congress intended to retain control in those areas not granted. Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 220-21 (1959).
269. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221 (1959).
270. E.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S.
681, 684 (1942); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832) (McClean, J., concurring).
271. See DeCoteau v. District Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975); McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970);
Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Alaska
Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576
(1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905).
272. See Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Tulee v. Washington,
315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-I1 (1899).
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the proper exercise of their sovereignty. In a very important sense, then, tribal
sovereignty is crucial to the preemption analysis. Because tribal sovereignty
exists subject to the plenary power of Congress, and because Congress, pursu-
ant to that plenary power, currently expresses firm commitment to the fullest
possible exercise of tribal sovereign powers, the exercise of tribal sovereignty is
an exercise of a right protected by the federal government. Whenever the state
seeks to regulate any activity within the competence of federally protected tri-
bal sovereignty, whether the activity occurs on or off the reservation, the court
should presume that state law is inapplicable.
Because tribes on the reservation no longer are isolated and totally sepa-
rate entities, and because in some instances state regulation of Indian activity
may be necessary to protect important state interests unrelated to Indian af-
fairs, the courts have allowed state regulation when the state could assert a
well-defined need for jurisdiciton. Thus, in the Puyallup cases the Supreme
Court permitted state regulation of off-reservation hunting and fishing rights if
the state could show that regulation was necessary to ensure preservation of
the resource and if the state could satisfy the court that its regulation of treaty
rights would be minimally intrusive on tribal sovereignty.273 In general,
though, the Court has not been as protective of tribal sovereignty in disputes
arising over state attempts to regulate on-reservation activity.274 The Court's
preemption analysis, unlike the Puyallup restrictions on state regulation of off-
reservation treaty rights, does not require the state to adopt the least restrictive
regulation possible, nor does it require the state to show that on-reservation
state regulation is necessary to further an important state interest. Since tribal
sovereignty over on-reservation activity, just as tribal sovereignty over the ex-
ercise of off-reservation treaty rights, is a federal right, state incursions on
either should admit of the same limited exceptions. It is difficult to understand
why the Supreme Court has been careful to ensure maximum protection of
tribal sovereignty over off-reservation treaty rights, while allowing state regu-
lation over on-reservation activity without the same high barriers against state
intrusion. A presumption of preemption would ensure that any state regula-
tion of treaty rights is subject to the same stringent analysis.
Once the presumption of preemption is triggered, the analysis suggested
here would allow state regulation if the state could overcome the presumption
with a specific showing that the activity is one requiring limited incursion into
tribal sovereignty. Specifically, the state would have to establish: (1) that it
has a heightened regulatory interest in the activity it seeks to regulate; (2) that
the regulation is aimed at activity with a substantial off-reservation nexus;
(3) that the regulation would not interfere with a comprehensive federal plan;
and (4) that the state regulation is necessary to the furtherance of the objective.
The first requirement does no more than restate the Court's recognition
273. Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Depart-
ment of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
274. The .uyallup analysis eventually was applied to limit state regulation on the reservation,
but only because some of the lands had been found to constitute a reservation after the original
decisions.
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that the state's ability to regulate treaty rights is narrower than its general po-
lice power.275 The other three, already recognized by the Court as important
factors in determining the legitimacy of state power over Indian affairs, 276
would ensure that the state articulate a well-defined need to implement an
important regulatory policy in the most limited way possible.
The Supreme Court has recognized the uniqueness of the preemption
analysis in Indian affairs. No clear expression of congressional intent is
needed; rather, the Court has been willing to find preemption of a particular
state activity that would interfere with the realization of Congress' attempt to
allow full exercise of tribal self-governance. 277 Adoption of a presumption of
275. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 401-02 n.14 (1973). In the hunting
and fishing context, the Court already has decided that state regulation of treaty rights is possible
only if the state can show that its regulations are necessary to preserve the species. Thus, the
state's general powers of game and wildlife management are reduced when treaty rights are the
target of state regulation. State regulation of other areas of reserved tribal sovereignty should be
similarly limited. In the taxing area, for instance, the state's legitimate interest in raising revenues
could satisfy the heightened standard if the state were seeking to impose the tax in exchange for
supplying valuable services, or if failure to tax could threaten the state's tax base. See Washington
v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 173 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Puyallup Court's limits on state police power
suggest a standard similar to the "middle tier" standard of equal protection most forcefully sug-
gested by Justice Marshall. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1, 98-110
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Under that analysis, the challenged state action must serve im-
portant governmental objectives. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See generally G.
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTrrTUONAL LAW 670-76 (10th ed. 1979).
276. The off-reservation nexus requirement finds support in Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), in which the Court found state
taxes applicable to on-reservation activity in part because "the value. . . is not generated on the
reservation by activities in which the Tribes have a significant interest." Id. at 155. That same
rationale was relevant to the Court's recent holding that state hunting and fishing laws were inap-
plicable to on-reservation activities, when the state had contributed nothing to the development of
the fish and wildlife resources. Mescalero, 103 S. Ct. at 2388.
The third criterion would invalidate state law interference with a comprehensive federal plan,
regardless of the legitimacy of state interest. Thus, if state jurisdiction would "disturb and disar-
range" a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965), the state will be unable to overcome the presumption. See also
Mescalero, 103 S. Ct. at 2387; Bracker, 448 U.S. at 148-49.
Finally, the requirement that state regulation be necessary to the furtherance of its objective
has been carefully developed in court cases limiting state regulations of off-reservation treaty
rights. See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); Department of Game v. Puyallup
Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968). This
requirement seems equally applicable to on-reservation disputes, in which the state is seeking to
regulate a different aspect of federally recognized tribal sovereignty.
277. The Court has expressly declined to adopt the Solicitor General's proposal that the In-
dian Commerce Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, should control adoption of a presumption of
preemption. Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 102 S. Ct. 3394, 3403 (1982). See
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 17-24, Ramah. The Court had previously emphasized
that "automatic exemptions" from state regulation, as a matter of constitutional law, are rare.
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980) (quoting Moe v. Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481 n.17 (1976)).
The Court's unwillingness to adopt the Solicitor General's theory may rest on its sensitivity to
Congress' plenary control over Indian affairs. Were the Court to find a constitutionally mandated
presumption against State interference, changing congressional policy would not alter the pre-
sumption. A statutorily based presumption, however, depends on continued congressional en-
dorsement of tribal self-development. Thus, the presumption could be modified in scope or
abandoned to adapt to a new congressional approach to tribal sovereignty.
The Solicitor General argued that its constitutionally based presumption could be responsive
to congressional changes in policy. See Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Cu-
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preemption would provide much-needed guidance to lower courts and to state
officials and would reduce the need for case by case Supreme Court review. 278
Moreover, incorporating federal recognition of tribal sovereignty into the pre-
emption analysis by adopting a presumption against the application of state
law would make the judicial inquiry a more honest one. It denies meaning to
the concept of tribal sovereignty to conclude, as the Court did in Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,279 that state taxation of
on-reservation cigarette sales to non-Indians did not infringe on tribal sover-
eignty, when the tribe had already enacted a comprehensive scheme for taxing
those same items and obtained enormous amounts of revenue from the on-
reservation sales.280 Instead, the Court should have recognized a presumption
of preemption, because the tribe had retained undisputed tribal sovereignty to
tax the on-reservation sale of cigarettes. The analysis then would have pro-
ceeded to consider the necessity and permissible extent of the infringement on
tribal sovereignty.
A strict preemption analysis along the lines suggested here, applied to the
Colville cigarette case, would have forced the state to articulate more clearly
the factors justifying infringement on tribal sovereignty. Although state taxa-
tion of cigarette sales within the state is normally a valid exercise of police
power, derogation of federally protected sovereign rights would require the
state to advance a particularly important or heightened interest in levying the
tax in question. If, for instance, the state could show that the taxpayers were
recipients of state services, or if the state could show serious potential damage
to its tax base, a sufficent state interest would have been established.281 Next,
the Court would have applied the off-reservation nexus requirement and
would have found that the tax was directed at items whose value was gener-
ated off the reservation. Thus, the second criterion would have been fulfilled.
Turning to the third criterion, the Court would have evaluated relevant federal
regulation. In this case, approval of the tribal taxing plan by the Secretary of
riae at 4, Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 102 S. Ct. 3394 (1982). Nevertheless, a
statutorily based presumption is better able to incorporate legitimate state concerns into the analy-
sis and is more clearly dependent on continued congressional approval.
278. See, ag., Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 102 S. Ct. 3394, 3403 (1982).
The Court has indicated its weariness at repeated disputes over conflicts between state and tribal
law: "The general question presented by this case has occupied the Court many times in the
recent past, and seems destined to demand its attention over and over again until the Court sees fit
to articulate, and follow, a consistent and predictable rule of law." Id. at 3404 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). See also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 137 (1980); Wash-
ington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 176 (1980) (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring).
279. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
280. The majority, while confirming the tribe's sovereign power to impose its own taxes on on-
reservation cigarette sales, concluded that the additional imposition of state taxes would not inter-
fere with the exercise of that sovereign power. Id. at 158-59. That conclusion is, at best, disingen-
uous. As the dissent pointed out, imposition of the state tax would place the tribes at a
tremendous competitive disadvantage, because its cigarettes would have to bear two tax burdens.
Id. at 170 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
281. One or both of those heightened state interests may have been present, id. at 156; how-
ever, the Court never required the state to substantiate its predicted "parade of horribles." Id. at
173 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the Interior was the government's only involvement. In the absence of express
congressional delegation of power 282 or statutory provisions regulating the tar-
get activity,2 83 the state could have satisfied the Court that its regulation would
not interfere with a comprehensive federal plan. With regard to the last crite-
rion, the Colville Court did not consider whether the burdens imposed on the
tribe were necessary to further the state's assumedly important interest in tax-
ing off-reservation value on the reservation. Had the Court applied the pro-
posed analysis, it would have insisted, for example, that the state demonstrate
that its enforcement mechanisms intruded on tribal sovereignty no more than
necessary.284 Because the Colville Court failed to require the state to establish
that imposition of the cigarette tax was justified by an important state need
that could not be protected in a manner less intrusive on tribal affairs, the
Court's decision failed to adhere to the Court's own standards for evaluating
state incursion on a federally protected right.285
C. The Presumption in Hunting and Fishing
Although the preemption analysis outlined above could have broad appli-
cation to all state attempts to regulate any conduct otherwise reserved to tribal
regulation,286 the approach is particularly applicable to hunting and fishing
rights, because it recognizes the extensive traditional relationship between the
tribe and its land.287 Moreover, Congress has repeatedly emphasized its intent
not to disturb tribal sovereignty over hunting and fishing288 and has provided
explicit enforcement mechanisms for tribal hunting and fishing codes. A fed-
eral trespass statute makes it a crime to hunt and fish on Indian lands without
282. The Court in United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), took for granted that state
law may be preempted by tribal ordinances enacted pursuant to specific federal statutory
authorization.
283. E.g, Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 102 S. Ct. 3394 (1982); Warren
Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
284. Compare Washington, 447 U.S. at 159-60 (tribes bear burden of showing record keeping
requirements invalid).
285. For general discussion and criticism of Colville, see Clinton, State Power over Indian Res-
ervations: A Critical Comment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D.L. REv. 434,440-43 (1981); Com-
ment, What About Colville?, 8 AM. INDIAN L.J. 161 (1980); Note, The Limits of Indian
Sovereignty- The Tribe Confronts the State in On-Reservation Taxation of Non-Indians, 18 Hous.
L. REv. 563 (1981); Note, Tribal Taxation Does Not Preclude State'sAuthoritv to Impose an Other-
wise Valid State Tax, 57 N.D.L. REv. 241 (1981).
286. For example, the applicability of state environmental laws to tribal lands is an area cur-
rently in dispute. See generally, Comment, The Developing Test/or State Regnlatory Jurisdiction in
Indian Country: Application in the Context of Environmental Law, 61 OR. L. Rnv. 561 (1982) and
sources cited id., at 563 n.17.
287. Mescalero, 630 F.2d at 728; see also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)
(access to and control of wildlife was "not much less necessary to the existence of the Indian than
the atmosphere they breathed").
288. E.g., Congressional proposals to abrogate Indian hunting and fishing rights have all died
in committee. H.R.J. Res. 246, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); H.R. 2738, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); S.J. Res. 170, 171, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Indian Fishing Rights-Fishery Management,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Widlffe Conservation and the Environment ofthe
House Comm on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1980). See also S.J. Res.
48, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.RJ. Res. 698, 87th Cong., 2d Ses. (1962). Indian Fishing Rights,
Hearings Before the Subcomrn on Indian Affairs of the Sen. Comm. on Internal & Insular Affairs,
88th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1964)
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tribal permission;289 in addition, the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981290 pro-
hibit interstate transportation of any fish or game acquired in violation of a
tribal ordinance.
As applied to Indian hunting and fishing rights, the preemption analysis
offered here would recognize the tribe's retained sovereignty to control hunt-
ing and fishing, both on the reservation and at off-reservation sites where
hunting and fishing rights have received either express or implied federal rec-
ognition. Thus, the distinction between between off- and on-reservation rights
would lose its significance; the inquiry would focus on whether the activity was
protected by federal law. The role of tribal sovereignty in such an inquiry
would be two-fold: first, it would define the limits to which tribes can assert
authority, invalidating any tribal attempt to exercise power in areas over
which its sovereignty has been divested. Second, it would define those areas in
which the presumption of preemption will be triggered. Any state attempt to
regulate matters over which the tribe has retained sovereignty, whether it has
exercised that sovereignty or not, would have to overcome the presumption
against state regulation by satisfying the test outlined above. In effect, this
analysis extends the Puyallup Court's narrowly defined limits of state power
over off-reservation Indian hunting and fishing to all aspects of Indian hunting
and fishing. To overcome the presumption, the state would be required to
establish a heightened regulatory need such as preserving resources or elimi-
nating safety hazards. Second, to establish an off-reservation nexus, the state
could show, for instance, that the resource was a migratory species, frequently
crossing reservation boundaries; or that state funds significantly contributed to
the development of the resource. Moreover, the state would have to demon-
strate that its regulation would not interfere with extensive federal regulation
of the development and exploitation of the resource. And finally, the state
would have to prove that the regulation was necessary to further its heightened
interest. Thus, adequate tribal self-regualtion would render state hunting and
fishing codes inapplicable.
To adopt the presumption of preemption would not be a drastic step for
the Court. Language in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,291 its most
recent evaluation of state regualtion of on-reservation activities, comes close to
establishing such a presumption. In addition, the Tenth Circuit's holding in
Mescalero expressly found a presumption applicable.292 Most importantly, a
presumption of preemption would ensure that Congress' firm commitment to
and encouragement of tribal self-determination finds adequate protection
289. 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982).
290. 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1982).
291. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Court noted that the state has
been permitted to assert its authority over nonmembers on the reservation in "certain" circum-
stances and over tribal members on the reservation in "exceptional" circumstances. Mescalero,
103 S. Ct. at 2384-85. Because the state is more likely to be able to overcome the presumption of
preemption when it seeks to regulate nonmembers, the preemption analysis correctly predicts this
difference in state power.
292. See Mescalero, 630 F.2d at 730, 732.
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against unwarranted state intrusion.2 93
V. CONCLUSION
Tribal sovereignty retains an important role in Indian hunting and fishing
rights. It establishes the limits to which tribes may exercise control over their
members and their territory. The validity of any tribal attempt to regulate
hunting and fishing depends on a finding that the tribe operates within the
bounds of undivested, federally confirmed tribal sovereignty. State attempts
to regulate areas in which the tribe's sovereign powers have been confirmed
raise difficult questions regarding the state's ability to regulate a federally pro-
tected right. Because the Supreme Court has long recognized that the tribes
are not totally insulated from state control, a proper analysis must give suf-
ficent protection to legitimate state interests while narrowly defining the in-
stances of state incursions on tribal sovereign powers. A statutorily based
presumption of preemption strikes the proper balance between state and tribal
interests. Reflecting firm congressional commitment to maximum tribal self-
development, the presumption of preemption requires the state to demonstrate
a well-defined regulatory need and ensures that the state regulation imposed
will be carefully tailored to advance that need in the manner least intrusive on
tribal sovereign powers.
293. As the Tenth Circuit said inMescalero, "The federally declared policy of self-determina-
tion becomes a mockery if it is subject to defeasance by the state." Id. at 734.
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